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PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS AS GATEKEEPERS 
 




Notwithstanding the considerable attention private equity 
receives, there continues to be substantial confusion about what 
private equity does and whether this creates value. Calls for more 
aggressive regulation of the industry reflect a skeptical view of 
private equity as—at best—a zero-sum game, in which profits are 
generated only at the expense of other constituencies. The standard 
defense of private equity points to its corporate governance 
advantages as a source of value. This Article identifies an 
overlooked and increasingly important way in which private equity 
creates value: private equity firms act as gatekeepers in the debt 
markets. As repeat players, private equity firms use their reputations 
with creditors to mitigate the problems of borrower adverse selection 
and moral hazard in the companies that they manage, thereby 
reducing creditors’ costs of lending to these companies. Private 
equity-owned companies are thus able to borrow money on more 
favorable terms than standalone companies, all else being equal. By 
acting as gatekeepers, private equity firms render the debt markets 
more efficient and provide their portfolio companies with an 
increasingly valuable borrowing advantage. Ironically, then, debt 
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Private equity—the business of buying and selling 
companies—is seemingly ubiquitous. Whether prompted by the 
fallout from the financial crisis or Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential 
campaign, private equity has caught the public’s attention, resulting 
in a barrage of conflicting claims as to private equity’s social worth, 
or lack thereof.1  
Public interest in private equity is unsurprising. Since its 
beginnings in the 1980s, private equity activity has grown 
dramatically, albeit in a highly cyclical fashion.2 Its most recent peak 
of activity coincided with the unprecedented merger wave of 2004 to 
2007 and came to an abrupt halt when the subprime-mortgage 
collapse caused the debt markets to seize up.3 The frenetic pace of 
activity during that period generated untold wealth for the largest 
private equity firms (KKR, Carlyle, Apollo, and the like), which in 
turn led to widespread calls to regulate and tax the industry more 
aggressively, both in the U.S. and abroad.4   
  
                                                            
1 For an overview of the different views on private equity, see Julie 
Creswell, Profits for Buyout Firms as Company Debt Soared, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 5, 2009, at A1; Steven M. Davidoff, With Private Equity Under Attack, 
Academia Tries to Quantify Its Value, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2012, at B4; 
James Surowiecki, Private Inequity, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, at 
21; Jia Lynn Yang, Romney’s Bain Capital Tenure Shows Mixed 
Bankruptcy Record, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2011, at A8; The Bain Capital 
Bonfire, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052970204879004577108500491449164.html.  
2 At its most recent peak of activity in 2006, private equity represented over 
20% of all mergers and acquisitions in the United States. Marc Martos-Vila, 
Matthew Rhodes-Kropf & Jarrad Harford, Financial vs. Strategic Buyers 2 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19378, 2013), 
available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/events/capitalMarket/pdf/CMW55 
Vila_M.pdf.  
3 See generally Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 481 (Mar. 2009); EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, 
CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, A PRIMER ON PRIVATE EQUITY AT 
WORK 11 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/ 
publications/private-equity-2012-02.pdf (explaining that “[d]eal activity 
slowed substantially beginning in the second half of 2007, and by 2009 was 
below its level [in] 2003”).  
4 Raising Taxes on Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2007, at A18.  
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Negative public sentiment towards private equity stems from 
the sense that its success comes solely at others’ expense.5 On this 
view, private equity is a particularly ingenious type of wealth 
transfer, in which private equity firms “privatize[] the gains and 
socialize[] the losses.”6 If the characterization of private equity as a 
mere shell game is warranted, the demands to curtail it should be 
heeded. But if instead private equity creates social value, the 
regulatory calculus is considerably more complex.  
The defense of private equity hews to a now-familiar story.7 
Private equity creates value, the argument goes, by providing better 
corporate governance, particularly as compared to public-company 
governance.8 With public companies, ownership (by dispersed 
shareholders) is divided from control (by management), giving rise 
to the familiar agency costs of management: managers have 
incentives to shirk, to use company assets for private benefits, and so 
forth, while public shareholders face a collective action problem 
preventing them from adequately supervising and incentivizing 
management.9 With private equity, however, ownership and control 
are reunited in the companies that private equity firms acquire (their 
“portfolio companies”).10 As the sole or controlling shareholder,11 
                                                            
5 In this depiction of private equity, the losers have at various points been 
identified as taxpayers, workers, creditors, selling shareholders of target 
companies, and even the investors in private equity funds. See discussion 
infra Part I.B.1. 
6 Anthony Luzzatto Gardner, Romney’s Bain Yielded Private Gains, 
Socialized Losses, BLOOMBERG VIEW (July 15, 2012, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-15/romney-s-bain-yielded-
private-gains-socialized-losses.html.  
7 See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
8 Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private 
Equity, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 121–22 (2009).  
9 Scott J. Davis, Would Changes in the Rules for Director Selection and 
Liability Help Public Companies Gain Some of Private Equity’s 
Advantages?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 85 (2009). For the original description 
of this feature of modern corporations, see ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & 
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
277–79 (1933).  
10 Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 123.  
11 As discussed infra in Part I, private equity portfolio companies are 
actually owned by the private equity fund (rather than the private equity 
firm). FRANCESCO BALDI, PRIVATE EQUITY TARGETS: STRATEGIES FOR 
GROWTH, MARKET BARRIERS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 9 (2013). Because 
a private equity fund delegates all managerial authority for its portfolio 
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private equity firms have both the ability and the incentives to ensure 
that their portfolio companies’ management acts in the private equity 
firms’ best interests. On this theory, then, private equity firms create 
value by reducing the agency costs of management. Our 
understanding of private equity has stalled in this debate over wealth 
transfers versus corporate governance benefits for quite some time.  
This Article tells a different story about private equity: 
private equity firms create value by acting as gatekeepers in the debt 
markets.12 They do so by reducing the agency costs of debt in their 
portfolio companies. As repeat players in the debt markets, private 
equity firms establish reputations with creditors that are tied to the 
credit performance of their portfolio companies. In turn, they use 
their reputations in the debt markets both to certify the 
creditworthiness of their portfolio companies ex ante and to bond 
against misconduct or poor performance by their portfolio companies 
ex post. Private equity firms thereby mitigate the problems of 
borrower adverse selection and moral hazard that plague creditors 
and increase lending costs above the efficient equilibrium. 
The most obvious benefit from this gatekeeping role is that, 
all else being equal, it should allow private equity-owned companies 
to borrow money on better terms than standalone companies, 
whether public or private.13 Thus, private equity-owned companies 
have not only a governance advantage, but also a borrowing 
advantage over other companies. Private equity firms reduce 
companies’ cost of debt capital and creditors’ lending costs, 
rendering the debt markets more efficient.  
Crucially, private equity’s gatekeeping role should be 
increasingly valuable in light of recent sweeping changes in the 
corporate loan markets.14 Lenders’ traditional methods of controlling 
borrower adverse selection and moral hazard—screening, 
                                                                                                                              
companies to the private equity firm, references throughout this Article to a 
private equity firm as the “sole” or “controlling” shareholder of a portfolio 
company are simply intended as shorthand. The more accurate description 
of the private equity ownership structure is used each time it leads to 
relevant distinctions, as in Part V.C, infra.  
12 See discussion infra Parts II–III, Appendix A.  
13 Victoria Ivashina & Anna Kovner, The Private Equity Advantage: 
Leveraged Buyout Firms and Relationship Banking, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 
2462, 2466 (2011). 
14 See discussion infra Part III.A.4 (summarizing current trends in debt 
markets). 
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monitoring, and covenants—are in sharp decline.15 Less than three 
decades ago, relationship banking was the dominant corporate 
lending model, giving banks the incentive and ability to monitor their 
borrowers closely.16 Today, however, corporate loans are typically 
funded by large numbers of both bank and non-bank creditors and 
may be traded or securitized to reach still more investors.17 Through 
this process, the information and control gap between borrowing 
companies and their ultimate creditors has increased significantly, 
while creditors’ incentives to monitor their borrowers have 
declined.18 Today’s creditors are thus dependent on others to signal 
borrowers’ creditworthiness. Private equity firms fulfill precisely this 
role. Accordingly, gatekeeping by private equity firms should be an 
increasingly valuable—though imperfect—substitute for traditional 
bank monitoring. After a post-financial crisis lull, private equity 
transactions are again picking up steam.19 It should come as no 
surprise that lenders are clamoring to fund them. 
The conception of private equity firms as gatekeepers 
advances the literature on private equity and the literature on 
gatekeeping, both of which are limited by their unerring focus on the 
problem of public company governance. As to the first, this Article 
reaches the novel conclusion that gatekeeping, not just governance, 
accounts for much of private equity’s value. Private equity is less 
about optimizing companies’ operations and governance than about 
brokering cheap financing. The corporate governance defense of 
private equity is thus not only incomplete, but likely overstated. We 
                                                            
15 Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit 
Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 643–44 (2009) 
(asserting that monitoring and covenants are no longer the most cost-
efficient ways to manage credit risk).  
16 Scott Page & Payson Swaffield, An Introduction to the Loan Asset Class, 
in THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATION AND TRADING 22–23 (Allison 
Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007). 
17 Whitehead, supra note 15, at 643.  
18 Id. at 645. 
19 Private equity went quiet for a stretch after its 2004 to 2007 heyday, first 
due to lack of capital and then due to overvalued targets and a dismal initial 
public offering (“IPO”) market, a key exit for private equity investments. 
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 127. There have been signs of an 
uptick in private equity activity, however, exemplified by the announcement 
of the $24 billion leveraged buyout of Dell led by the private equity group 
Silver Lake Partners. Matt Wirz, A Reboot for Buyouts? Depends on Dell 
Deal, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2013, at C1.  
2013-2014 PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS AS GATEKEEPERS 121 
 
should think of private equity firms as lending to companies not only 
their operational expertise, but also (and perhaps more importantly) 
their financial reputations. As to the second, this Article 
demonstrates that there is a broader array of gatekeepers and 
gatekeeping strategies than scholars typically suppose. The 
foundational example of a gatekeeper is that of an independent 
professional organization such as an audit firm that certifies 
companies for the benefit of investors. Yet the same frameworks that 
have proven useful in identifying when such gatekeepers will be 
successful apply equally well to “insider” gatekeepers such as private 
equity firms and to their more expansive form of gatekeeping, which 
includes not only the traditional certification function, but also 
monitoring through direct control and selecting more credit-worthy 
companies ex ante. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a 
background on the mechanics of private equity acquisitions and 
financings, and summarizes the literature on private equity’s social 
worth. Part II sets forth the claim that private equity firms act as 
gatekeepers in the debt markets, and introduces a simple framework 
for identifying financial-market gatekeepers. Applying this 
framework to today’s debt markets, Part III demonstrates 
conceptually how and why private equity firms act as gatekeepers. 
Part IV assesses private equity firms’ performance as gatekeepers by 
interpreting available evidence and distinguishing other hypotheses 
for the private equity borrowing advantage. Part V identifies 
potential limitations on the gatekeeping role of private equity firms 
and compares them to the more established debt-market gatekeepers, 
the credit rating agencies. It concludes with a brief discussion of the 
current regulatory implications of private equity firms’ gatekeeping 
function. Finally, Appendix A provides a formal proof of the 
gatekeeper thesis, modeling the interactions between private equity 
firms and lenders as a repeated-game involving agency costs.  
 
I. The Private Equity Puzzle 
 
A. Background: Private Equity LBO Transactions 
 
Although the term “private equity” may be used to refer to a 
broad range of private investing, for purposes of this Article, private 
equity is defined as the business of buying and selling whole 
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companies, using (in part) borrowed money.20 A “private equity 
firm” is a group of investment professionals that raises money from 
investors21 and pools it in one or more investment vehicles (“private 
equity funds”) for the purpose of engaging in private equity.22 When 
a private equity fund acquires a company—a transaction referred to 
as a “leveraged buyout” or “LBO”—only a portion of the acquisition 
price, typically 10-40%, comes from its own pooled funds.23 The 
remaining 60-90% of the purchase price is borrowed from third 
parties.24 The borrower in an LBO is neither the private equity firm 
nor the private equity fund, but rather the target company itself.25 
The key characteristic of an LBO is that the target company is made 
to borrow against its own assets to buy out existing shareholders.26 
Thus, while the private equity firm negotiates the target company’s 
debt terms with creditors, the creditors have recourse only to the 
assets of the target, and not those of the private equity firm, the 
private equity fund, or any other portfolio company of the private 
equity firm.27 Upon completion of the acquisition (as depicted in 
Figure 1 below), the private equity fund is the controlling 
shareholder of a highly leveraged company, that is, one with a high 
ratio of debt to equity.28  
                                                            
20 In other words, this Article focuses on a particular type of private equity 
transaction, the leveraged buyout (“LBO”). LBO funds invest in mature 
companies (in contrast to venture capital funds, which invest in start-ups) 
by acquiring a controlling ownership interest in the company (in contrast to 
hedge funds, which most typically make minority investments in publicly-
traded corporations). Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 121. 
21 Private equity firms raise these large pools of funds from institutional 
investors (such as pension funds, university endowments, foreign 
governments, etc.) and high net-worth individuals, who delegate to the 
firms all authority to acquire and dispose of companies with the funds. Id. at 
123. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 125. 
24 Id. at 124.  
25 APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 3, at 14.  
26 19 AM. JUR. 2d Corporations § 2181 (2013) (“A ‘leveraged buyout’ or 
LBO is a method of acquiring a company by which the acquirer leverages 
(or borrows against) the assets of the target company to finance the 
purchase of the target company’s shares from the selling shareholders.”).  
27 APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 3, at 14.  
28 An operating company’s leverage may be measured by either the ratio of 
debt to equity or the ratio of debt to the accounting measure of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (“EBITDA”). SIDNEY 
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A private equity firm manages one or more private equity 
funds at once, and each such fund typically holds several companies 
at once.30 Each portfolio company issues its own debt, which may 
consist of senior loans (“bank debt”), high-yield bonds, mezzanine 
debt, or some combination thereof.31 While the private equity fund is 
the actual owner of the portfolio companies, the investors in a private 
equity fund have a purely passive role.32 The private equity firm is 
solely responsible for identifying acquisition targets,33 providing 
                                                                                                                              
S. GOLDSTEIN, 1 ADVISING SMALL BUSINESSES § 12:31 (2013); Richard 
Wight, Warren Cooke & Richard Gray, Understanding the Credit 
Agreement, in THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING 209, 
298 (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007). The distinction between 
the two is irrelevant for purposes of this Article. 
29 Solid arrows in the figure indicate ownership. 
30 Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1, 9 (2008).  
31 Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 124–25. 
32 In the United States, the private equity fund is most commonly organized 
as a limited partnership, of which the private equity firm is the general 
partner and the passive investors are the limited partners. Id. at 123. 
33 Private equity funds may acquire both public companies (in a “going 
private” transaction) and companies that are already privately held. Id. at 
127–28.  
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management services to any acquired companies (including by 
negotiating their financings), and, after a few years, selling them off 
again.34  
 




B. Searching for Value in Private Equity 
 
As private equity has expanded both in size and scope since 
its beginnings in the 1980s, the debate as to its merits has 
intensified.35 Immediately prior to the 2007 to 2008 financial crisis, 
the characterization of private equity firms as “Barbarians at the 
Gate”36 seemed to be a historical artifact. However, with the onset of 
the financial crisis, the continuing economic difficulties in the United 
States, and Mitt Romney’s presidential campaign, private equity 
                                                            
34 See APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 3, at 13 (“The general partner makes 
decisions about which properties or companies to buy, how they should be 
managed, and when they should be sold.”). After owning a company for the 
desired period (say, three to eight years), a private equity fund will 
generally exit the investment in one of three ways by: (1) taking the 
company public through an IPO, (2) selling it to another company seeking 
to make a strategic acquisition (e.g., a large operating company looking for 
synergies), or (3) selling it to another LBO fund (a “secondary LBO”). 
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 129. 
35 For a brief, non-technical review of the studies and theories on the costs 
and benefits of private equity, see Davidoff, supra note 1, at B4.  
36 BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE 
FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990). 
2013-2014 PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS AS GATEKEEPERS 125 
 
once again became a focus of (largely negative) public scrutiny.37 
This sub-part summarizes the extant literature and views on whether 
private equity creates value.38 
 
1. Private Equity Skeptics 
 
Skepticism about private equity boils down to the view that 
private equity is nothing more than a transfer of wealth from less 
sophisticated or less organized parties (such as selling shareholders, 
dispersed creditors, workers, and taxpayers) to the pockets of private 
equity professionals and, possibly, their investors.39  
One form of such skepticism views private equity as pure 
financial trickery.40 This view expresses surprise bordering on 
disbelief that private equity firms appear to generate above-market 
returns from their portfolio companies.41 The reason is simply that, to 
casual observers, private equity firms do not appear to do much of 
anything. They purchase companies, attend board meetings, and then 
sell to the highest bidder after a few years.42 If capital markets are 
efficient, this process should not lead to above-market returns for 
private equity firms or their investors.43  
Such skeptics are in fact correct that private equity firms 
rarely implement drastic changes in their portfolio companies. While 
                                                            
37 See sources cited supra note 1. 
38 The literature and press on private equity frequently conflate four 
overlapping, yet distinct questions: (1) whether private equity generates 
profits for private equity firms, (2) whether private equity generates profits 
for investors in private equity funds, (3) whether private equity increases 
social welfare overall, and (4) whether private equity creates any social 
value (which may or may not result in a net increase in social welfare, 
depending on the social costs that private equity imposes). This sub-part is 
primarily concerned with the fourth question. 
39 Robert J. Samuelson, The Private Equity Boom, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/14/ 
ar2007031402177.html. 
40 E.g., Michael Gordon, Private Equity Boom Was a Clumsy Trick, FIN. 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at 9.  
41 Id. 
42 Cheffins & Armour, supra note 30, at 11.  
43 Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 122 (suggesting that private equity 
firms generate profits—despite not increasing the value of portfolio 
companies—by taking advantage of favorable market timing and market 
mispricing).  
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they sit on their companies’ boards and provide them with advisory 
services (usually related only to major corporate events such as 
financings and acquisitions), they do not take over day-to-day 
management duties of their companies.44 Nor do they consistently 
replace management when they acquire a company—in fact, they 
proudly advertise their goal of teaming up with existing management 
when they make acquisitions and are viewed as friendlier to 
management than other acquirers.45 To such a critic, then, private 
equity necessarily involves a financial sleight-of-hand, either in the 
buying or selling of companies (e.g., private equity firms are 
consistently able to buy low and sell high only by preying on the 
ignorance of public shareholders) or in the calculation or publication 
of its returns.46 
Under the second form of skepticism, the harms imposed by 
private equity extend well beyond the financial realm.47 Here, private 
equity is criticized for reducing social welfare by: (1) bankrupting 
U.S. companies,48 (2) harming American workers,49 (3) pocketing 
unjustified tax subsidies,50 or all of the above.   
First, private equity firms are said to cause companies to take 
on too much debt, and to use that debt solely for the benefit of the 
                                                            
44 Cheffins & Armour, supra note 30, at 13 (explaining that while “general 
partners can use their power at the board level to execute a swift executive 
turnover,” they instead generally “opt for an advisory role”).  
45 See Michael Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and 
Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 770–75 
(2003) (describing the interest of private equity funds in “maintaining a 
reputation for treating successful managers well”). 
46 Even serious commentators argue that private equity investors may be 
getting lower returns than private equity firms claim. See Dan McCrum, 
Private Equity Fees Called into Question, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2012 at 1. 
However, this debate touches more on the division of profits between the 
private equity managers (the investment professionals) and their investors 
than on whether private equity generates value as a whole. Id. 
47 Creswell, supra note 1, at A1.  
48 Id. (blaming private equity firms for sending many U.S. companies into 
bankruptcy).  
49 Steven J. Davis et al., Private Equity and Employment 32 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17399, 2011), available at 
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/steven.davis/pdf/privateequityandemployme
nt.pdf (finding that “pre-existing employment positions are at greater risk of 
loss in the wake of private equity buyouts”).  
50 Surowiecki, supra note 1, at 21.  
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private equity firm—whether explicitly (by issuing themselves a 
large dividend)51 or implicitly (by using the debt to outbid other 
potential acquirers of a company)52—rather than for the benefit of 
the companies. By stripping cash out of U.S. companies, perhaps 
private equity firms leave companies too susceptible to bankruptcy.53 
Even if these companies manage to avoid bankruptcy, the argument 
goes, they will be left with too little cash to invest in long-term, 
value-creating projects, with negative long-term consequences for 
the U.S. economy.54 On this view, private equity firms keep all of the 
upside from their portfolio companies’ performance, while the 
downside is borne by creditors and by the general public. 
  
                                                            
51 David Callahan, Bad Debts, Big Profits: How Private Equity Firms Turn 
Red Ink into Gold, HUFFINGTON POST (May 23, 2013, 1:45 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-callahan/bad-debts-big-profits-
how_b_1539328.html (explaining that private equity firms use debt to 
“create a pile of cash, some of which they can direct their own way in the 
form of management fees and dividends”).  
52 Robert P. Bartlett III, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing 
Distorts Bidding Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1975, 1980 (2008) (arguing that debt financing provides private equity 
firms with an advantage over other potential acquirers of a target company). 
53 E.g., Surowiecki, supra note 1, at 21. 
54 Several recent empirical projects offer serious challenges to these claims, 
however. Private equity-owned portfolio companies are found to default on 
their loans at the same or lower rates as comparable non-sponsored 
companies. Edie Hotchkiss, David C. Smith & Per Strömberg, Private 
Equity and the Resolution of Financial Distress 23–24 (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 331/2012, 2011); see also 
Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 129 (finding a lower default rate for 
their sample of private equity-owned companies than for all U.S. corporate 
bond issuers from 1980 to 2002). Further, the costs of financial distress 
appear to be lower for private equity-owned companies, as they achieve 
voluntary restructuring more often and, if that fails, spend less time in 
bankruptcy. Hotchkiss et al., supra, at 23–24 (asserting that private equity 
firms actively facilitate the restructuring of firms, and shorten the 
bankruptcy process by pre-negotiating bankruptcy terms and aiding in the 
screening process). Finally, several papers have produced evidence that 
private equity portfolio companies innovate more, engage in more research 
and development, and generally invest more (more efficiently) than their 
public company counterparts. E.g., Josh Lerner, Morten Sorensen & Per 
Strömberg, Private Equity and Long-Run Investment: The Case of 
Innovation, 66 J. FIN. 445, 446, 474 (2011). 
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Second, critics complain that the wealth of private equity 
firms is generated at the expense of workers, who may be laid off en 
masse following a private equity acquisition (or lose their jobs in a 
future bankruptcy, as discussed above).55 Private equity firms may 
indeed be slightly more willing to lay off workers than comparable 
public companies.56 However, recent evidence suggests that these 
layoffs are more than offset by the higher growth rates and 
subsequent hiring of private equity-owned companies; on a net basis, 
private equity firms create more jobs than comparable public 
companies.57 Notwithstanding this evidence, it could still be the case 
that private equity’s labor track record involves a net welfare loss, if 
the unmeasured social costs from firing some workers (social unrest, 
psychological distress, crime, etc.) are greater than the benefits of 
creating more jobs overall. 
Finally, private equity is criticized for exploiting two key 
subsidies from U.S. taxpayers: (1) the deductibility of interest 
payments and (2) the capital gains treatment of carried interest 
payments. First, because private equity depends on the ability to 
borrow substantial amounts of debt, it undeniably benefits from the 
fact that interest payments on debt are generally tax-deductible for 
corporations,58 while payments on stock—such as dividends and 
redemptions—are not.59 The tax advantage of debt implies that 
private equity firms may increase the value of their portfolio 
companies simply by making greater use of leverage than public 
companies tend to.60 Proponents of this view argue that private 
equity’s success is entirely tax-driven, and what Congress gives, 
Congress can (and perhaps should) take away.61 If the private equity 
                                                            
55 E.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Mother Jones Meets Gordon Gekko: The 
Complicated Relationship Between Labor and Private Equity, 79 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1317, 1329–31 (2008). 
56 Davis et al., supra note 49, at 5–7 (finding layoff rates at acquired 
companies typically increase at rates slightly higher than “control” 
companies (i.e., companies in similar financial situations that have not 
undergone private equity takeovers)).  
57 Id. at 4. 
58 26 U.S.C. § 163(a) (2006).  
59 BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 4.01 (2013). 
60 Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 131. 
61 Surowiecki, supra note 1, at 21 (arguing that Congress should alter the 
U.S. tax code to close the “loopholes” through which private equity firms 
make money).  
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value-add is simply causing companies to adopt a tax-efficient level 
of debt, it is not necessarily a socially optimal one.  
Second, private equity professionals pay tax on much of 
their income at lower rates than they would as salaried workers.62 A 
significant portion of the compensation of private equity managers 
consists of the gains from selling their portfolio companies, referred 
to as the “carried interest.”63 Currently, carried interest income is 
treated as capital gains under the U.S. tax laws and is therefore 
generally subject to tax at a reduced rate.64 Critics complain that the 
carried interest is the product of the private equity managers’ labor, 
not mere passive gain, and should therefore be treated as ordinary 
income, which would be taxable at higher rates.65 On this view, the 
capital gains treatment for carried interest income is an unjustified 
subsidy to the private equity industry, allowing it to draw the best 
and brightest young professionals away from the fields in which they 
would otherwise have exercised their talents.66 
 
2. Proponents of Private Equity 
 
Those who champion private equity adopt two strategies in 
responding to critics. The first is to show that the claimed harms 
                                                            
62 Thomas J. Brennan & Karl S. Okamoto, Measuring the Tax Subsidy in 
Private Equity and Hedge Fund Compensation, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 27, 39–
42 (2008); David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private 
Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715, 729–30 (2008). 
63 Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 124 (defining “carried interest” as 
the share of profits of the fund a general partner earns, which frequently 
equals almost 20%).  
64 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND 
ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED 
INTERESTS AND RELATED ISSUES, PART I, JCX-62-07, 3. This was the 
explanation given by Mitt Romney for why his effective income tax rate is 
so low. John D. McKinnon & Sara Murray, Romney Offers New Tax 
Details, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2012, at A1. 
65 E.g., Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in 
Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008). 
66 For proposals to tax all or a portion of private equity’s carried interest 
income as ordinary income, rather than as capital gains, see American Jobs 
Act of 2011, H.R. 12, 112th Cong. § 412 (2011); American Jobs and 
Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. Sess. § 412 
(2010); H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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imposed by private equity are either illusory or exaggerated.67 The 
second is to identify sources of value from private equity, which 
might more than offset its costs. This section summarizes arguments 
employing the latter strategy.   
If private equity firms rarely make major operational 
changes to their portfolio companies, how can they possibly add 
value? The literature suggests that private equity firms make certain 
subtle changes that, while modest, have a measurable impact on 
company performance.68 And the use of leverage magnifies the 
return to shareholders from any such changes. 
First and foremost, private equity provides an effective form 
of corporate governance for its portfolio companies, particularly as 
compared to the public company model.69 Private equity minimizes 
the severe agency costs that exist with public company management 
as a result of the separation of ownership (by dispersed shareholders) 
and control (by hired management).70 As compared to dispersed 
public shareholders, private equity firms may be better at both 
monitoring and incentivizing management.71 Private equity firms 
monitor management both directly and indirectly. First, private 
equity firms appear to be more closely involved in management 
oversight than the independent directors of public companies: their 
                                                            
67 For examples of this strategy, see supra note 54. 
68 Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 122–23; see generally Robert S. 
Harris, Tim Jenkinson & Steven N. Kaplan, Private Equity Performance: 
What Do We Know? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
17874, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17874 (indicating 
that, empirically, private equity-owned companies outperform public 
companies).  
69 Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of Uncorporation 13–14 (Univ. of Chi. Coll. 
of Law, Working Paper No. 83, 2007), available at http://law.bepress. 
com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1082&context=uiuclwps.  
70 Id. at 3, 22.  
71 Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 131–32. The private equity 
governance advantage may be increasing as a result of companies’ greater 
use of derivatives in recent years. Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, 
Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and 
Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 245, 251 
(2009). Recent work suggests that derivatives render companies more 
opaque to their boards of directors, thus inhibiting the effective monitoring 
of management, and that private equity sponsors are more experienced with 
derivatives than public company boards. Id. 
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portfolio companies have smaller boards that meet more frequently.72 
Private equity firms also make available to their portfolio companies 
financial and industry/operational expertise—they specialize in the 
former, and often hire consultants or executives for the latter.73 
Second, private equity firms are skilled at identifying 
underperforming management and, when necessary, replacing 
them.74 Yet the most effective form of monitoring by private equity 
firms is an indirect one—namely, the disciplining effect of the very 
high leverage that they impose on their portfolio companies.75 The 
constant pressure of having to make regular interest and amortization 
payments on the company’s debt is thought to keep management 
focused on maximizing cash flow and firm value.76 Further, it 
eliminates the inefficiencies that arise from having significant cash 
on hand, which management may be tempted either to hoard for self-
interested reasons or to spend on bad projects.77 
In addition, private equity firms incentivize management 
differently from publicly traded companies: (1) they require 
managers to invest more of their own money in the company (to 
have more “skin in the game”);78 (2) a greater proportion of 
management’s compensation is awarded in the form of equity;79 and 
                                                            
72 Francesca Cornelli & Ōguzhan Karakas, Private Equity and Corporate 
Governance: Do LBOs Have More Effective Boards?, in 1 THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS WORKING PAPERS 
VOLUME 1: THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 
2008 65, 72 (World Econ. Forum 2008), available at http://www3. 
weforum.org/docs/WEF_IV_PrivateEquity_Report_2008.pdf. 
73 Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 132. The case for the contribution 
of financial and industry experts may well be overstated, however, given 
how leanly staffed private equity firms are. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of 
the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1989, at 70. 
74 See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 132 (explaining one study’s 
finding that in companies with “poorly performing management . . . one-
third of chief executive officers . . . are replaced in the first 100 days while 
two-thirds are replaced at some point over a four-year period.”). 
75 Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance 
and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324 (1986).  
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 324; Stewart C. Myers, Still Searching for Optimal Capital 
Structure, 6 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 4, 14 (1993). 
78 Kate Burgess & Peter Smith, Shareholders Split on C&W’s Private 
Equity-Style Pay Plan, FIN. TIMES, May 24, 2006, at 23.  
79 Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 251–52.  
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(3) the equity awarded to management is comparatively illiquid 
(since it cannot be cashed out until an event such as an IPO or other 
sale of the company occurs), which reduces management’s 
incentives to manipulate short-term financial results and keeps it 
focused on longer-term results.80 
Second, private equity leads to a more efficient market for 
corporate control.81 At base, LBOs consist of the buying and selling 
of corporate control and, by deepening the takeover market, should 
render it more efficient.82 And this is so quite apart from the merits 
of any particular ownership model. While private equity may well 
constitute a superior governance model to public shareholding for the 
reasons discussed above, these benefits are not necessary for private 
equity to render companies more efficient. The mere threat of being 
acquired should cause companies (more specifically, management) 
to perform better. Although private equity is presented as a rival to 
publicly traded stock, the relationship is more accurately described 
as symbiotic. Buyout funds depend on the existence of inefficient 
public companies to make outsized returns.83 Therefore, the private 
equity model not only competes with, but relies on, the public 
company model. In this way, the LBO market provides a de facto 
check on the inefficiencies of public ownership.84 
                                                            
80 Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 130–31. 
81 M. Todd Henderson & Richard A. Epstein, The Going-Private 
Phenomenon: Causes and Implications, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009) 
(arguing that ensuring private equity remains “a vibrant component of the 
market for corporate control which is so essential to the efficient operation 
of public companies”). 
82 Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate 
Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 9, 23–24 (1983).  
83 Jensen, supra note 73, at 65. 
84 In keeping with the thesis of this Article, the same point can be made 
slightly differently. Private equity consists of a form of arbitrage that should 
lead to more efficient capital markets. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra at note 8, 
at 137–38. One of the skills developed by private equity firms is the ability 
to recognize and act on “mispricings” between the debt and equity markets. 
Id. Specifically, buyout funds time the debt markets to borrow cheaply in 
order to acquire inefficient and undervalued public companies. Id. In that 
manner, private equity funds effectively capitalize on inefficiencies in the 
debt markets to correct inefficiencies in the equity markets. Id. As 
arbitrageurs of the two types of capital markets, private equity funds serve 
the useful purpose not only of eventually reducing price discrepancies 
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Third, in taking public companies private, private equity 
yields cost savings by avoiding public-company securities law 
disclosure and compliance requirements (such as Sarbanes-Oxley)85 
and arguably by shielding management from frivolous shareholder 
lawsuits.86 Of course, this benefit exists only while the company 
remains private, whereas the benefits of private equity-driven 
operational changes appear to persist for at least several years after 
the company goes public again.87 Further, these cost savings may 
well be overstated, as many of the larger private equity portfolio 
companies voluntarily engage in public financial reporting in any 
event, for example when they issue public bonds.88 More 
importantly, the net social value of these costs savings is unclear, as 
it depends on the value to society of mandatory information 
disclosure.  
Weighing the evidence on both sides, the academic literature 
for the most part concludes—tentatively—that private equity is, on 
net, a positive phenomenon.89 Yet private equity may well be too 
recent and protean a phenomenon for definitive conclusions to be 
drawn. The work of measuring the known costs and benefits of 
private equity has only recently begun in earnest, and, I argue, we 
have overlooked one such benefit entirely. This Article corrects this 
oversight in the next Part, by identifying an additional way in which 
private equity creates value.   
 
                                                                                                                              
between the two markets, but also of directly bringing to the market’s 
attention ineffective management in public companies. Id.  
85 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.). 
86 Henderson & Epstein, supra note 81, at 3.  
87 Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 224 n.25. 
88 Robert P. Bartlett III, Going Private but Staying Public: Reexamining the 
Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 7, 43 (2009) (finding that “after [Sarbanes-Oxley], private bidders are 
actually more likely to subject themselves to continuing SEC reporting 
obligations . . . when structuring a large-scale take-private transaction”). 
89 E.g., Henderson & Epstein, supra note 81, at 5 (opining that the current 
assessment of private equity is “positive and promising but complex and 
nuanced”); Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 143 (concluding that 
“[t]he empirical evidence is strong that private equity activity creates 
economic value on average”). 
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II. Private Equity Gatekeeping: Thesis and Framework 
 
A. Claims and Assumptions 
 
In the midst of a global recession, with the scarcity of capital 
still widely decried, a private equity consortium led by TPG Capital 
was able to borrow $1.6 billion to acquire the apparel retailer J.Crew 
in one of the biggest leveraged buyouts of 2011, valued at 
approximately $3.1 billion.90 J.Crew went from a pre-acquisition 
capital structure with no material debt to one financed with 60% 
debt.91 Despite such high leverage, TPG was able to negotiate the 
debt on highly favorable terms. Although rated speculative grade due 
to the high leverage, the J.Crew loans had certain borrower-friendly 
features that were then rarely extended even to borrowers with 
investment-grade rated loans.92 What can account for these favorable 
debt terms? And is this a good thing? 
The primary claim of this Article is that private equity firms 
create value by acting as gatekeepers in the debt markets. As repeat 
players in the debt markets, private equity firms have the reputational 
incentive to minimize the credit risk of their portfolio companies, 
and they do so by acting as both “certification intermediaries”93 and 
what I will refer to as “monitoring intermediaries” between their 
portfolio companies and creditors. 
From this primary claim follows a secondary one: private 
equity-owned companies have not only a governance advantage, but 
also a borrowing advantage.94 If the gatekeeper hypothesis is correct, 
                                                            
90 J.Crew Grp., Registration Statement (Form S-4), at 14, (June 22, 2011) 
[hereinafter J.Crew S-4]; Michael J. de la Merced, J.Crew Shareholders 
Approve $3 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2011, at B5.   
91 J.Crew S-4, supra note 90, at 14.  
92 In particular, the J.Crew term loans were “covenant-lite,” meaning that 
the company was not required to maintain leverage at or below a certain 
threshold throughout the term of the loan. See id. at F-24. Instead, the 
company is only subject to a leverage test at the time that it seeks to incur 
additional debt. Id. at II-6, Exhibit 10.2 (Credit Agreement), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1051251/000119312511062380/de
x102.htm (Section 7.03 of the agreement outlines the conditions under 
which the firm may incur additional debt but does not include a leverage 
requirement).  
93 Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 
918 (1998). 
94 Cheffins & Armour, supra note 30, at 24.  
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all else being equal a private equity-owned company should be able 
to borrow money on more favorable terms than a standalone 
company, due to its lower credit risk. (The claim is not that private 
equity portfolio companies on average obtain loans on better terms 
than other companies. Private equity-backed companies on the whole 
take on significantly more leverage than otherwise comparable 
companies, and are therefore riskier from a lender’s perspective. All 
else being equal, this should entail worse loan terms for the 
borrower. Returning to the example above, the claim is instead that 
J.Crew could not have borrowed as much as it did under TPG had it 
remained a public company, or could only have done so on far less 
favorable terms.) 
Several clarifications of this secondary claim are in order. 
First, what is meant by borrowing “on more favorable terms”? 
Simply that a private equity-owned company will either be able to 
borrow more money than its standalone counterpart (on otherwise 
the same terms), or that it will be able to borrow the same amount of 
money but with more borrower-friendly provisions, such as a lower 
interest rate, lower fees, a longer maturity, or less restrictive 
conditions, covenants, and events of default.95 If correct, the thesis 
entails that private equity firms provide the valuable function of 
lowering companies’ cost of debt capital. 
Second, “all else being equal” means that, other than with 
respect to their ownership (private equity-sponsored versus non-
sponsored), the companies are identical from a creditor’s 
perspective. In other words, we assume that at the time at which they 
are compared, the companies have identical operating and financial 
characteristics, identical types and amounts of debt in their capital 
structure, identical management and incentive plans for management, 
identical information about the company available to creditors, and 
so forth. These assumptions are not intended to approximate 
reality;96 they simply serve to isolate the effect of reputation on debt 
terms.   
 
                                                            
95 Id. at 24; Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 256.  
96 Private equity firms have substantially more leverage than otherwise 
comparable companies, and, when one compares them to public companies, 
they are thought to exhibit better governance and make less information 
available to creditors. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 255–56; see 
Whitehead, supra note 15, at 664 (describing how less information is 
available about private borrowers than public).  
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B. Gatekeeping in the Financial Markets—A 
Framework  
 
Gatekeepers are broadly understood to be private actors that 
can prevent companies’ misconduct in a specific market.97 The 
precise definition of a gatekeeper is somewhat elusive, however, as 
the gatekeeper literature has evolved in two directions. The first, 
associated with Reinier Kraakman, defines a gatekeeper as any party 
from whom a company needs a good or service, and who can prevent 
the company’s misconduct simply by refusing to provide it.98 The 
second, associated primarily with John Coffee, defines a gatekeeper 
as “a reputational intermediary who provides verification or 
certification services to investors.”99 The first is broad enough to 
cover all types of markets and is agnostic as to the gatekeeper’s 
incentive for preventing company misconduct—on this view, any 
party from whom the company needs a good or service can be made 
a gatekeeper, simply by imposing liability on such party for the 
company’s misconduct.100 The second pertains only to the financial 
markets and stipulates that the gatekeeper’s incentive to intervene is 
its reputation in the market with investors.101 For the remainder of 
this Article, the term “gatekeeper” will mean a reputational 
intermediary in one or more financial markets, in accordance with 
Coffee’s understanding of the term. 
The key to identifying gatekeepers is understanding why 
gatekeepers are needed in the first place. In the financial markets, 
dispersed investors have imperfect information about companies and 
limited control over them, and companies can exploit this asymmetry 
by misrepresenting their quality to investors or by engaging in 
misconduct undetected. Because investors are aware of this 
possibility ex ante, they will invest less and will do so on less 
                                                            
97 Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party 
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 54 (1986). 
98 Id. at 53.  
99 John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of 
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 309 (2004). Though 
this version of the gatekeeper definition is associated with John Coffee, the 
concept of a reputational intermediary originated with Ron Gilson and 
Reinier Kraakman. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 618 (1984). 
100 Kraakman, supra note 97, at 61–66.  
101 Coffee, supra note 99, at 302. 
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company-favorable terms than they would in the presence of perfect 
information and control.102 This makes both investors and companies 
worse off.103 A gatekeeper can step in to bridge this gap between 
investors and companies by staking its reputation as to companies’ 
quality or conduct, as applicable.104 Gatekeeping therefore provides 
the socially valuable function of facilitating a more efficient level of 
investment.105 
The gatekeeper literature offers an array of different 
frameworks and approaches for identifying gatekeepers and 
assessing their performance.106 I distill these into a simple framework 
comprising three basic requirements for a gatekeeper in a financial 
market:  
 
(1) the market at issue must exhibit some 
inefficiency resulting from information and/or 
control problems between companies and 
investors;107 
(2) the proposed gatekeeper must have the incentive 
to mitigate the problem(s);108 and  
(3) the proposed gatekeeper must have the ability to 
mitigate the problem(s).109 
                                                            
102 See Choi, supra note 93, at 933. 
103 Id. at 933–34 (explaining “social welfare is reduced relative to the 
perfect information case because purchasers willing to purchase high-
quality goods at above the cost of production are unable to do so”). 
104 Coffee, supra note 99, at 308. 
105 See Choi, supra note 93, at 946–47. 
106 See generally Choi, supra note 93; Coffee, supra note 99; Ronald J. 
Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side 
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869 (1990); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper 
Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53 (2003); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on 
Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers To Improve the Regulation of Financial 
Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019 (1993); Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers 
Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411 (2008); Frank Partnoy, 
Barbarians at the Gatekeepers? A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability 
Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001); Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple 
Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583 (2010).  
107 Tuch, supra note 106, at 1594–95. 
108 Kraakman, supra note 97, at 62. 
109 Kim, supra note 106, at 414. In addition, it cannot be the case that all of 
the companies in the market have the exact same ex ante quality and ex post 
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This framework will be applied in Part III to private equity firms’ 
role in the debt markets. 
 
C. Broadening the Gatekeeper Concept 
 
 By now, it will have occurred to the reader that private 
equity firms are atypical candidates for gatekeeping. Indeed, much of 
the gatekeeper literature either implicitly or explicitly assumes that 
gatekeepers are independent professional organizations,110 which 
have the power to prevent companies’ misconduct because they 
provided them with a needed service.111 The conception of 
gatekeepers as third-party service providers is plain in the most 
commonly proffered example of gatekeeping, namely the 
requirement that start-up companies obtain comfort letters from 
nationally-recognized accounting firms in order to complete an 
IPO.112 
 A private equity firm is clearly not a third party from the 
perspective of its portfolio companies. As the entity with sole control 
of the company, it may well be the consummate insider. Nor is it 
fundamentally a service provider to its companies. In the context of 
debt financing, the company does not seek out the private equity firm 
to negotiate its debt; rather, the private equity firm causes the 
company to take on debt in the first place.113 
Is being a strictly independent third party a fundamental 
requirement for gatekeeping or merely a common characteristic of 
gatekeepers in practice? From a functional perspective, there is no 
reason why insiders should be dismissed out of hand as potential 
gatekeepers. So long as they satisfy the fundamental goal of 
financial-market gatekeeping—limiting the degree to which 
companies exploit their information advantage over investors—the 
terminology can and should be expanded to cover insiders. 
Accordingly, recent work argues that even inside counsel can act as 
                                                                                                                              
performance. See generally Choi, supra note 93. This assumption is clearly 
satisfied in practice.  
110 Coffee, supra note 99, at 302 (describing gatekeepers as “independent 
professionals”). 
111 Gilson, supra note 106, at 883 (claiming that a gatekeeper must provide 
“some service which the wrongdoer must have to accomplish his goal”). 
112 Coffee, supra note 99, at 302.  
113 APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 3, at 13–15.  
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gatekeepers for their companies, under certain conditions.114   
Strict independence is not necessary for successful 
gatekeeping; all that is required is a sufficient divergence of the 
gatekeeper’s incentives and those of management, so that the 
baseline incidence of company misconduct is reduced.115 Although 
private equity firms closely monitor the officers of their portfolio 
companies, they do not actually exercise management of the day-to-
day business of the company, leaving that instead to hired officers.116 
While such managers might benefit from a one-time event in which 
they mislead creditors, for example, the private equity firm will 
benefit less, due to the long-term reputational harm from doing so.117 
Thus, the incentives of private equity firms do not perfectly overlap 
with those of management, and this mismatch enables private equity 
firms to act as gatekeepers, by constraining management’s behavior 
toward creditors to at least some degree.   
To conclude, whether private equity firms can be referred to 
as gatekeepers should depend only on whether they are successful at 
the task, which is addressed in the following three Parts. 
 
III. Private Equity Gatekeeping: Application 
 
This Part III applies the gatekeeping framework introduced 
above to demonstrate that private equity firms act as gatekeepers in 
the debt markets with respect to their portfolio companies. The three 
requirements for successful gatekeeping—the existence of 
information and/or control problems limiting investment in the 
market and of a gatekeeper with both the incentive and the ability to 
mitigate these problems—are satisfied because: (1) the debt markets 
suffer from the agency costs of adverse selection ex ante and moral 
hazard ex post, which lenders are increasingly unable to control on 
                                                            
114 Gilson, supra note 106, at 883; Kim, supra note 106, at 413. 
115 See Coffee, supra note 99, at 304.  
116 STEPHANIE R. BRESLOW & PHYLLIS A. SCHWARTZ, PRIVATE EQUITY 
FUNDS: FORMATION AND OPERATION 1:19–1:20 (Practising Law Institute 
2013). 
117 I readily concede that the degree to which a gatekeeper is independent 
from the company will likely impact the calculus involved in determining 
whether to impose gatekeeper liability and in what form, but it is less 
relevant for pure market-based gatekeepers, such as private equity firms. 
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their own;118 (2) as repeat players in the debt markets, private equity 
firms have the reputational incentive to exert efforts to mitigate these 
agency costs in their portfolio companies;119 and (3) private equity 
firms have the ability to mitigate these agency costs through their 
extensive knowledge of, and control over, these companies.120 Each 
of these three requirements is discussed in turn below. 
 
A. The Agency Costs of Debt 
 
That some degree of information asymmetry exists between 
companies and investors is uncontroversial: even with the largest 
public companies, which are required by law to disclose all 
“material” information to the public, may have a long and well-
established track record, and whose stock and bonds are heavily 
traded, management will always know more about their companies’ 
prospects than will investors.121 Separately, passive investors 
exercise only imperfect control over companies.122 In the debt 
markets specifically, information asymmetry and limited investor 
control together give rise to two well-known sources of inefficiency, 
referred to collectively as the agency costs of debt.123    
 
1. Adverse Selection   
 
First, information asymmetry between borrowing companies 
and creditors leads to adverse selection among borrowers.124 If 
creditors are unable to perfectly discern a borrower’s quality, they 
will offer loans to borrowers on terms that correspond to the average 
expected quality of borrowers in the market.125 Because high-quality 
borrowers are disadvantaged by this outcome while low-quality 
borrowers benefit from it, higher-quality borrowers may begin to exit 
the market while lower-quality borrowers will try to borrow more 
                                                            
118 Albert Choi & George Triantis, Market Conditions and Contract Design: 
Variations in Debt Contracting, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 51, 62, 68 (2013).  
119 Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 239. 
120 Id. at 253–54.  
121 Id. at 246–47.  
122 Lee Harris, A Critical Theory of Private Equity, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 259, 
268–69 (2010). 
123 Jensen, supra note 75, at 323. 
124 JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 2 (2006).  
125 Choi, supra note 93, at 933. 
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than they otherwise would.126 As the quality of borrowers in the 
market declines, lenders will respond by offering less favorable debt 
terms to borrowers, to reflect the change in average borrower 
quality.127 This will cause still more high-quality borrowers to exit 
the market and debt terms to further worsen, and so on.128 The upshot 
for borrowing companies is that, as a whole, they will receive 
fewer/smaller loans and on worse terms than they would if creditors 
had perfect information about their quality.129  
 
2. Moral Hazard 
 
The second agency cost of debt is that of borrower moral 
hazard. While adverse selection arises ex ante (before the money has 
been loaned), moral hazard arises ex post. Once borrowers have the 
money in hand, they have incentives to act in ways that favor their 
shareholders over their creditors.130 This problem, also referred to as 
the shareholder-creditor conflict, results from shareholders and 
creditors having differing claims on a company’s assets.131 As the 
residual claimants of a corporation, shareholders receive all of the 
upside from corporate actions (once liabilities have been repaid), 
whereas creditors can, at most, get back the amount that they loaned, 
plus the agreed-upon interest and fees.132 For both groups, losses are 
limited to the money they put into the company (which, in the case 
                                                            
126 Whitehead, supra note 15, at 664–66. 
127 See Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, 
Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical 
Disclosure Literature, 31 J. ACC. & ECON. 405, 408 (2001).  
128 See Choi, supra note 93, at 943–945 (providing a simple model of 
adverse selection applicable to any market in which company quality 
varies). 
129 See TIROLE, supra note 124, at 114 for a model of credit rationing. Under 
certain conditions, adverse selection can cause all higher-quality companies/ 
producers to exit the market, leaving only low-quality ones. George A. 
Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 495 (1970).  
130 George Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory of Secured Debt and 
Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2155, 2158 (1994). 
131 Id. 
132 Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 
U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1927 (2013).  
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of the company’s management, may be nothing at all).133 As a result, 
shareholders have incentives to cause the company to divert wealth 
from creditors, for example, by pursuing excessively risky projects 
(particularly if the company is near insolvency), distributing assets to 
the shareholders as dividends, or issuing additional debt of the same 
or higher priority as that of its existing creditors.134  
As with adverse selection, the existence of moral hazard 
results in borrowers obtaining less favorable debt terms ex ante.135  
 
3. Traditional Creditor Responses to Agency 
Costs 
 
Clearly, the presence of borrower adverse selection and 
moral hazard has not caused the corporate debt markets to unravel, 
largely because creditors have developed strategies to deal with these 
agency costs.  
In the case of adverse selection, the traditional approach is 
for creditors to expend resources on screening the borrower prior to 
lending in order to more accurately discern the borrower’s credit risk 
(and without relying solely on the borrower’s good faith).136 
                                                            
133 James C. Spindler, How Private is Private Equity, and at What Cost?, 76 
U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 326 (2009). 
134 Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: 
An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118–19 (1979). 
135 The finance literature lacks a comprehensive model for how debt terms 
are determined. Victoria Ivashina & Zheng Sun, Institutional Demand 
Pressure and the Cost of Corporate Loans, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 500, 510 
(2011) (stating “the current literature does not have a defined set of loan-
pricing factors”). Yet the primary determinant of a borrower’s debt terms is 
undoubtedly its credit risk (that is, the likelihood that creditors will recover 
the amount that they lend to the borrower). OCC, COMPTROLLER’S 
HANDBOOK: RATING CREDIT RISK 21 (2001). A borrower’s credit risk is for 
the most part a function of the operational characteristics and performance 
of the borrower (cash flow, industry sector, etc.), the capital structure of the 
borrower (in particular, its leverage), and features of the proposed debt itself 
(priority, security, guarantees, maturity). Id. at 21–22. Beyond credit risk, 
other determinants of a borrower’s debt terms should include liquidity risk 
(the ease with which a creditor can transfer its interest in the borrower’s 
debt to another creditor), prevailing market-wide yields, transaction costs, 
relative bargaining power between the borrower and the creditors, and so 
forth. Id.  
136 TIROLE, supra note 124, at 87–88. 
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Creditors screen borrowers primarily in two ways: (1) by performing 
due diligence on the company prior to lending and (2) by 
maintaining long-term lending relationships with their borrowers.137 
In the case of moral hazard, creditors have primarily employed two 
methods to limit borrower misconduct: (1) direct monitoring and (2) 
debt covenants.138 
Monitoring. Under the traditional model of bank lending, in 
which a single bank extends the loan to the borrowing company and 
holds the loan to maturity, the bank has both the incentive and the 
ability to monitor the borrower closely.139 Banks have thus 
historically had a cost advantage in monitoring borrowers, making 
banks the intermediary of choice to whom the task of direct 
monitoring was delegated.140 
Debt Covenants. All corporate borrowings are subject to 
covenants made by the company to its creditors.141 The term 
“covenants” here refers broadly to all of the contractual provisions in 
credit agreements, indentures, notes, and other debt contracts that 
restrict the borrower’s activities or require it to take certain actions 
deemed desirable by its creditors.142 The value of covenants to 
creditors (and thus to borrowers) is obvious when one recalls that 
there is no legal prohibition on companies favoring shareholders at 
the expense of creditors—quite the contrary. While shareholders are 
owed fiduciary duties by the directors143 and officers144 of the 
                                                            
137 Id.; Whitehead, supra note 15, at 665–66. 
138 Whitehead, supra note 15, at 664–65.  
139 Id. at 651–53.  
140 Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated 
Monitoring, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 393, 393 (1984). 
141 See TIROLE, supra note 124, at 105 (describing covenants as “the heart of 
a loan agreement”).  
142 Id. at 83–86, 103–05. Thus, “covenants” in this informal sense will 
include typical categories of debt contract provisions such as financial 
covenants, negative covenants, affirmative covenants, events of default, 
representations and warranties, and borrowing conditions precedent. Id.  
143 See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90–91 (Del. 2001) 
(affirming that directors’ duty of care may not be waived in Delaware); 
Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399-VCL, 2009 WL 857468, at *4 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 23, 2009) (holding the same with respect to directors’ duty of loyalty). 
144 E.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708, 709 n.37 (Del. 2009) 
(explicitly recognizing that officers of Delaware corporations have fiduciary 
duties to shareholders). 
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corporation, creditors are not.145 Thus, borrowers are not liable for 
misconduct toward their creditors unless they voluntarily assume 
contractual liability, which is the principle behind covenants.146 
 
4. The Decline of Monitoring and Covenants 
 
Today, however, monitoring and covenants are receding in 
the debt markets. Public debt has always relied less heavily on 
monitoring and covenants than has private debt, for reasons that will 
become clear below.147 Yet as a result of sweeping changes to the 
private debt markets over the last three decades, monitoring and 
covenants are declining in the private market as well, which makes 
up the vast majority of corporate debt.148 
The driving force is the rapid adoption of the practice of loan 
syndication, in which corporate loans, rather than being held by a 
single bank until maturity, are instead funded from the outset by 
large numbers of creditors.149 Post-issuance, syndicated loans may be 
traded to still more creditors on an increasingly liquid secondary 
                                                            
145 The lone exception to this general rule applies if the company becomes 
insolvent, in which case the directors’ fiduciary duties are for the benefit of 
creditors. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 
930 A.2d 92,101–03 (Del. 2007); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns, 621 A.2d 784, 
787–88 (Del. Ch. 1992); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe 
Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *1155–57 (Del. 
Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
146 The theory behind these provisions was first expounded in a seminal 
article relating to bond covenants. Smith & Warner, supra note 134, at 117. 
Lenders ask for, and borrowers covenant to abide by, such provisions 
because they maximize the value of the company by optimally addressing 
moral hazard. The tradeoff is between (1) giving management free reign to 
extort money from lenders (which would cause lenders not to extend any 
credit to the company, or only at exorbitant rates) and (2) giving lenders 
100% control of the company (which would lead to poor performance). Id. 
147 See generally Whitehead, supra note 15. 
148 Id. at 662 (describing the increase in “cov-lite” loans since 2005). For 
ease of presentation, throughout this discussion the term “public debt” 
should be thought of as publicly traded bonds, while “private debt” should 
be thought of as senior corporate loans (or “bank debt,” as practitioners 
refer to it).  
149 Id. For a description of the loan syndication process, see Ivashina & Sun, 
supra note 135, at 503–08. 
2013-2014 PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS AS GATEKEEPERS 145 
 
market, in which banks now represent a small minority.150 Corporate 
loans, once the near-exclusive province of banks, are now routinely 
held by an ever-widening array of financial institutions, including 
mutual funds, hedge funds, insurance companies, finance companies, 
pension funds, foreign institutions, and securitization vehicles, such 
as collateralized loan obligation (“CLO”) funds.151 While a 
syndicated loan is still typically negotiated between the borrowing 
company and a single bank, known as the “lead arranger,”152 it is 
ultimately funded by a large number of lenders (the “syndicate”) 
gathered by the lead arranger.153 By the end of the syndication 
process, the lead arranger may end up holding only a very small 
piece of the loan or none at all.154 
Decline in monitoring. What happens to the monitoring 
function of creditors when bank debt is syndicated? As the number 
                                                            
150 GLENN YAGO & DONALD MCCARTHY, MILKEN INST., THE U.S. 
LEVERAGED LOAN MARKET: A PRIMER 26–27 (2004).  
151 Bartlett, supra note 52, at 2013; YAGO & MCCARTHY, supra note 150, at 
26–27. 
152 Lead arranger positions for large syndicated loans tend to be 
monopolized by large investment or commercial banks. Barry Bobrow, 
Mercedes Tech & Linda Redding, The Primary Market, in THE HANDBOOK 
OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING 155, 172 (Allison Taylor & Alicia 
Sansone eds., 2006) (stating that the top three lead arrangers together 
covered 47% of the total syndicated loan market in 2005); Anil Shivdasani 
& Yihui Wang, Did Structured Credit Fuel the LBO Boom?, 66 J. FIN. 
1291, 1306 (2011) (finding that after 2004, the top ten LBO lenders held a 
94% share of the market in LBO lending). According to the Loan Pricing 
Corporation, in the first quarter of 2012, the top three bookrunners held 
44% of the market share. Press Release, Loan Prod. Co., Refinancings 
Drive 1Q12 Leveraged Lending, M&A Absent (Apr. 5, 2012), available at 
https://www.loanpricing.com/2012/07/refinancings-drive-1q12-leveraged-
lending-ma-absent/.  
153 Under the traditional one-bank-one-borrower model, the bank acts as an 
intermediary between the borrower and its ultimate creditors, the bank’s 
depositors. Diamond, supra note 140, at 393. Under the syndication model, 
the lead arranger serves as the intermediary between the borrower and the 
rest of the syndicate—a form of secondary intermediation. Katerina Simons, 
Why Do Banks Syndicate Loans?, NEW ENG. ECON. REV. 45, 46 (Jan./Feb. 
1993).  
154 Jian Cai, Competition or Collaboration? The Reciprocity Effect in Loan 
Syndication 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 09-
09R, 2010), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/ 
2009/wp0909r.pdf.  
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of creditors grows, creditors’ incentives to monitor the borrower 
decline, due to a familiar free-rider problem.155 Any given member 
of a large lending syndicate will have little incentive to monitor the 
borrower because direct monitoring is costly, and any benefit 
therefrom will have to be shared among all of the creditors.156 Each 
syndicate member will thus prefer to free-ride on the efforts of 
others. Therefore, the growth of syndication is predictably 
accompanied by a decline in the direct monitoring of borrowers. 
Nor can this void in monitoring be filled simply by 
delegating the task to the lead arranger of the syndicate.157 To begin 
with, lead arrangers are equally subject to the free-rider problem in 
that the benefits of their monitoring would be shared with all lenders. 
(Recall that lead arrangers may hold only a small portion of the loans 
that they arrange, if any.) Because the results of monitoring effort on 
the lead arranger’s part are particularly difficult to observe and 
measure, the other syndicate members cannot simply compensate the 
lead arranger to monitor the borrower on their behalf.158 Thus, the 
growth of syndication has gone hand in hand with a decline in the 
monitoring of borrowers. 
Decline in covenants. The move from a single-bank to a 
loan-syndication model introduces new transaction costs to the 
                                                            
155 Shivdasani & Wang, supra note 152, at 1315–16; Hugh Thomas & 
Zhiqiang Wang, The Integration of Bank Syndicated Loan and Junk Bond 
Markets, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 229, 306 (2004). For the original description 
of collective action problems, see Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of 
Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, in HARVARD 
ECONOMIC STUDIES 124 (1965). 
156 Amir Sufi, Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: 
Evidence from Syndicated Loans, 62 J. FIN. 629, 641–42 (2007). It is for 
this reason that publicly traded bonds do not involve creditor monitoring. 
Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade & Marcel Kahan, A New Governance 
Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 469 (1998–1999) 
(explaining that a “bond indenture will contain few covenants; and those 
that appear entail little monitoring”).  
157 Thomas & Wang, supra note 155, at 306 (stating that the lead arranger 
for a syndicated loan is not tasked with monitoring the borrower, but rather 
performs a relatively mechanical role with very little discretion). 
158 Sufi, supra note 156, at 641–42. Again, the analogy to publicly traded 
bonds is a useful one. The trustee of a bond issuance is paid compensation 
by the bondholders, yet for the most part performs only a ministerial role. 
Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma 
of the Indenture Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1037, 1044 (2008).  
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corporate loan market: the same renegotiation and holdout costs that 
arise with widely dispersed public bonds.159 As the number of 
creditors holding a loan increases, so do the costs of making changes 
to the loan terms due to a collective action problem among the 
lenders.160 If the borrower needs to obtain a waiver or an amendment 
to the loan terms, it must obtain the consent of a large group of 
disparate and unrelated lenders, instead of negotiating with a single 
bank.161 This may prove either impossible or prohibitively expensive, 
even though all parties would prefer the proposed change to the loan 
terms to the alternative of bankruptcy, or it may prevent the borrower 
from pursuing a value-creating transaction.162 Because this collective 
action problem can decrease the value of the company, lenders 
rationally agree ex ante to more permissive covenants in the credit 
agreement in order to decrease the likelihood that the borrower will 
default on the loan or require other changes to its terms.163 This is 
exactly what occurs in the public debt markets, where disparate and 
uncoordinated ownership entails substantially looser covenants.164 
                                                            
159 See Amihud et al., supra note 156, at 467–78 (describing transaction 
costs associated with public bonds).  
160 Id. at 459–60.  
161 Robert O. Wienke, Loan Syndications and Participations: Trends and 
Tactics, 9 COM. LENDING REV. 4, 22 (1993–1994). 
162 Id. at 24. In addition, the creditor that holds out the longest is likely to 
get the biggest payout from the borrower, so all creditors have an incentive 
to delay. John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: 
The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and 
Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1238 (1991). 
163 Alan M. Christenfeld & Barbara M. Goodstein, Covenant-Lite Loans 
Rise Again, 250 N.Y. L.J. 67 (2013); Stephen Foley, Covenant Lite Loans 
Lose Their Stigma in the Hunt for Yield, FIN. TIMES, June 1, 2013, at 12.  
164 Christenfeld & Goodstein, supra note 163. A simple example may help 
illustrate the point. Assume that a company borrows from a single bank, and 
that the credit agreement contains a financial covenant requiring the 
borrower not to exceed a leverage ratio of 4 to 1 at any time while the loan 
remains outstanding. This covenant may be set at a slightly optimistic level, 
with the implicit understanding that the borrower can return to the bank to 
negotiate a new covenant level if it ends up proving necessary. Now, if the 
company were to refinance this loan with a syndicated loan funded by a 
large number of creditors, the new credit agreement could conceivably 
require only that the borrower not exceed a leverage ratio of 3 to 1. The 
more permissive covenant level in this instance reflects the creditors’ 
understanding of the inefficiencies involved in renegotiating credit 
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Thus, the onset of loan syndication has required a loosening of 
covenants in borrowers’ credit agreements.165   
The benefits of loan syndication and secondary trading are 
obvious: greater diversification for lenders and greater access to 
capital for borrowers.166 Yet syndication exacerbates adverse 
selection and moral hazard in the loan market by prompting a decline 
in monitoring and covenants.167 The key implication of this 
fundamental change in the nature of corporate lending is that private 
equity’s gatekeeping role in the debt markets should be increasingly 
valuable to lenders. If private equity firms can fill the monitoring 
void left by lenders, their portfolio companies will reap the benefits 
of cheaper debt.   
 
B. Private Equity Firms’ Incentive to Mitigate 
Agency Costs  
 
In order for private equity firms to qualify as gatekeepers, 
creditors must have some assurance that private equity firms will 
exercise efforts to mitigate the agency costs of debt. This sub-part 
argues that, because they are high-volume, repeat players in the debt 
markets, private equity firms have strong reputational incentives to 
ensure that their portfolio companies behave as “good” borrowers. 
Therefore, they can credibly commit to mitigating both adverse 
selection (by acting as certification intermediaries) and moral hazard 
(by acting as monitoring intermediaries) in their portfolio companies. 
 
                                                                                                                              
agreement terms, which may more than offset the benefits of tighter control 
of the borrower.  
165 Cem Demiroglu & Christopher M. James, The Role of Private Equity 
Group Reputation in LBO Financing, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 306, 306–09 (2010). 
For example, in their sample of 183 going-private LBOs, the authors found 
that no private equity firm had a “covenant-lite” loan (an exceptionally 
borrower-favorable type of loan) before 2004, while nearly 60% did 
through part of 2007. Id. at 315. In volume terms, they report that covenant-
lite loans in LBO financings grew from $0 in 2000 to over $93 billion in the 
first half of 2007. Id. at 307. 
166 See Bobrow et al., supra note 152, at 176. 
167 Miguel Meuleman, Mike Wright, Sophie Manigart & Andy Lockett, 
Private Equity Syndication: Agency Costs, Reputation and Collaboration, 
36 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 616, 620 (2009).  
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1. Repeat Players 
 
Though private equity firms themselves do not borrow for 
acquisitions, they are nonetheless high-volume, repeat players in the 
debt markets.168 On behalf of their many portfolio companies, they 
negotiate more frequent borrowing, and of greater amounts, than do 
standalone companies.169 A single private equity firm should 
generate significantly more borrowing volume than a standalone 
company because it manages several borrowing companies at once, 
each of which is more highly leveraged than a typical standalone 
company.170   
First, a typical private equity-owned portfolio company 
borrows far more than an otherwise identical standalone company.171 
                                                            
168 Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2466. 
169 See id. at 2462–63 (explaining that “LBO firms are important clients for 
banks because of the frequency and scale of their transactions”).  
170 I propose yet another reason why the volume of a private equity firm’s 
borrowing should outweigh that of a standalone company: one might expect 
LBO portfolio companies to refinance their loans more frequently than 
other companies. Because they are more highly leveraged, LBO portfolio 
companies are more sensitive to interest rates and should therefore seek to 
refinance more often as the prevailing market interest rate margin changes. 
Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Buyout Groups Set Refinancing Record, FIN. 
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, at 13 (describing an increase in private equity 
refinancings in an attempt to “lock into low interest rates”). Further, a 
portfolio company’s debt must be refinanced when the company is 
ultimately sold by the LBO fund (due to a standard credit agreement 
provision requiring the repayment of the loan upon a change of control of 
the borrower), which occurs relatively frequently. See Wight et al., supra 
note 28, at 346, 350–51. Indeed, all LBO funds have a limited lifespan of, 
say, ten years. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 123. If a portfolio 
company is acquired in year seven of the fund’s existence, and the debt 
incurred in connection with the acquisition has a maturity of, say, six years, 
the debt will have to be refinanced only five years into its term at the latest. 
171 Recent work found that out of a sample of 1157 leveraged buyout 
companies and matched public companies, the median leverage ratio 
(measured as the ratio of net debt to EBITDA) for private equity-owned 
companies was 0.70, as compared to 0.35 for public companies. Ulf 
Axelson, Tim Jenkinson, Per Strömberg & Michael S. Weisbach, Borrow 
Cheap, Buy High? The Determinants of Leverage and Pricing in Buyouts, 
68 J. FIN. 2223, 2239 (2013) (showing in Table IV “the median values of 
net debt . . . to enterprise value . . . and net debt to earnings before interest, 
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Although it is commonly accepted that private equity-owned 
companies are highly leveraged, less thought has been given to why 
this is so. Recent contributions to the literature suggest two 
explanations: first, that debt provides private equity firms with an 
advantage in bidding for target companies,172 and second, that the 
standard allocation of profits between private equity firms and their 
investors creates incentives for private equity firms to maximize their 
portfolio companies’ leverage.173 Thus, when a private equity fund 
acquires a company, it causes the company to incur debt on the order 
of 50-80% of total enterprise value and will seek to maintain as high 
a level of debt as possible throughout its term of ownership.174 In 
contrast to typical companies, private equity-sponsored companies 
borrow as much as the market will allow, and they borrow 
independently of their operational need for debt.175 In contrast, public 
companies (for example) tend to borrow relatively little and 
primarily for operational reasons.176 
                                                                                                                              
taxes, depreciation, and amortization” for a sample of LBOs and public 
companies).  
172 See generally Bartlett, supra note 52. Note that this explanation does not 
account for the well-documented fact that private equity-owned companies 
deliberately maintain very high leverage ratios following their initial 
acquisition. 
173 Ulf Axelson, Per Strömberg & Michael S. Weisbach, Why Are Buyouts 
Levered? The Financial Structure of Private Equity Funds, 64 J. FIN. 1549, 
1555 (2009). 
174 Id. 
175 Id.; Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg & Weisbach, supra note 171, at 4. 
The latter demonstrates that the amount of leverage in private equity-owned 
companies is completely unrelated to that in comparable public companies, 
and that such leverage is chosen for entirely different reasons. The authors 
describe the pattern of leverage in LBO portfolio companies and public 
companies as the inverse of one another. Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg & 
Weisbach, supra note 171, at 4.  
176 Operational reasons for borrowing include the need to even out the cash 
flows of a highly seasonal business or to make a planned acquisition. Public 
companies borrow comparatively little for a variety of reasons. First, they 
are subject to the well-recognized agency problem that management has 
incentives to avoid the excessive monitoring and control by creditors that is 
traditionally thought to accompany corporate loans. Jensen, supra note 75, 
at 323–25. One manifestation of this is public company management’s 
preference for having excess free cash on hand for self-interested reasons, 
as opposed to operating leanly as high leverage would require. Id. Second, 
risk-averse managers should be reluctant to incur debt: as leverage 
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Second, the volume of borrowing is tipped even further 
toward private equity when one compares a given private equity firm 
to a given standalone company. A private equity firm often manages 
several funds at once, each of which owns several portfolio 
companies.177 Aggregating all of the borrowing of a given private 
equity firm’s portfolio companies, it becomes clear that a private 
equity firm will be active in the debt markets more frequently and for 
greater amounts than would the management of a single company 
comparable in size to one of the private equity firm’s portfolio 
companies. Thus, the sheer volume of borrowing by private equity 
firms makes it appropriate to view them as being involved in 
repeated game with creditors in the debt markets. 
 A concrete example may help to illustrate the disparity in 
borrowing size and frequency between a standalone company and a 
private equity firm. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. (“KKR”), 
the largest private equity firm in the world, led the leveraged 
acquisition of Del Monte Corporation on March 8, 2011.178 Until it 
was acquired by KKR, Del Monte had been operating as a public 
company since February 1999.179 Using datasets from Thomson 
Reuters LPC’s DealScan database, Table 1 below compares the U.S. 
syndicated loan transactions completed by Del Monte during its time 
as a standalone, publicly traded corporation to those completed by 
KKR on behalf of its various portfolio companies during the same 
period. While Del Monte completed only six syndicated loan deals 
during the relevant twelve-year period for a total of $6.1 billion, 
                                                                                                                              
increases, so does the company’s risk of insolvency, and thus the risk that 
managers might lose their jobs. Id. Lastly, my own view is that public 
companies may also simply grow out of their debt. If a company performs 
well, its EBITDA increases, and its leverage ratio therefore decreases 
naturally unless new debt is incurred. Yet, unlike a private equity-sponsored 
company, a public company is less likely to incur additional debt in that 
case because it does not face the same constant pressure to maximize 
leverage (discussed above) as private equity firms do. 
177 Harry Cendrowski & Adam A. Wadecki, Introduction to Private Equity, 
in PRIVATE EQUITY HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND OPERATIONS 3, 6–8 (2d 
ed. 2012). 
178 Del Monte Corporation, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (June 15, 
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1259045/ 
000119312511189323/d10k.htm [hereinafter Del Monte 10-K]. 
179 Our History, DEL MONTE FOODS, http://www.delmontefoods.com/ 
company/default.aspx?page=oc_ourhistory (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).  
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KKR completed ninety-eight for a total of $176.2 billion.180 
 
Table 1. Borrowing Comparison: KKR vs. Del Monte (Pre-LBO) 
 
U.S. syndicated loan deals completed between February 1999 and 
March 2011 by Del Monte Corporation and by all KKR portfolio 
companies. 
 
 # of Deals Aggregate Size  
 
Del Monte Corp. 
 
6  $ 6.1 billion  
KKR 
 
98  $ 176.2 billion 
 
2. Effect on Incentives 
 
a.  Reputation with Creditors 
Generally 
 
As repeat players in the debt markets, private equity firms 
have the reputational incentive to act as gatekeepers.181 As we have 
seen, the ability to borrow massive amounts of debt on good terms is 
the sine qua non of private equity. Because they are constantly 
seeking to obtain or refinance debt for one of their various portfolio 
companies, private equity firms have much to gain from dealing with 
creditors in good faith, and much to lose otherwise.182 Creditors have 
                                                            
180 DealScan Report, THOMSON REUTERS LPC, https://www.loanpricing. 
com/products/solutions-for-the-primary-market/loanconnectordealscan/ 
(datasets on file with author). The case of Del Monte also illustrates the 
separate point that individual companies tend to take on substantially more 
debt once they are acquired by private equity firms. According to SEC 
filings, Del Monte’s aggregate debt load increased from $1.26 billion to 
$3.97 billion in connection with its 2011 acquisition by KKR. Del Monte 
10-K, supra note 178, at 57. 
181 Rongbing Huang, Jay R. Ritter & Donghang Zhang, Private Equity 
Firms’ Reputational Concerns and the Costs of Debt Financing 3 (Oct. 24, 
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2205720.  
182 Andrew Keay, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns 
Relating to Efficiency and Over-Protection of Creditors, 66 MOD. L. REV. 
665, 667 (2003).  
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the opportunity to observe the track record of a private equity firm’s 
portfolio companies over time, which will affect the debt terms that 
the firm is able to negotiate for its companies in the future.183 Thus, 
private equity firms have strong incentives to ensure good borrowing 
behavior by their portfolio companies and thereby establish and 
maintain good reputations with creditors.184   
In this regard, private equity firms’ incentives diverge 
enough from those of the managers of their portfolio companies that 
they will behave differently toward creditors than management 
would at least some of the time. It is undeniable that a private equity 
firm, as the sole shareholder of its portfolio companies, would 
benefit in the short-term from any gains derived from 
misrepresentations or misconduct by one of its portfolio companies 
with respect to its creditors.185 Under normal circumstances,186 
however, the long-term harm to the firm’s reputation from such 
misconduct should outweigh the short-term benefit. This divergence 
between private equity firms’ and management’s incentives enables 
                                                            
183 Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2464–67.  
184 This is not to say that examples of private equity errors in judgment or 
“misbehavior” towards lenders do not exist. For example, some dividend-
recapitalization transactions initiated by private equity sponsors (in which 
the portfolio company borrows additional debt for the sole purpose of 
issuing a dividend to the private equity fund that owns it) have left portfolio 
companies with too little equity cushion, which eventually led to 
insolvency. A notable example is the 2004 bankruptcy of KB Toys, which 
occurred only twenty months after Bain Capital caused it to undergo a 
dividend-recapitalization. Bain Capital Buys Toys Unit of Consolidated 
Stores, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2000, at C3; Nicholas Confessore, Christopher 
Drew & Julie Creswell, Buyout Profits Keep Flowing to Romney, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at A1. Such missteps undoubtedly had a negative 
impact on the relevant private equity firms’ ability to negotiate financing on 
good terms, at least in the short run. Conversely, private equity funds have 
on occasion contributed additional equity to their portfolio companies in 
order to avert or cure a default on their debt; information about such 
occurrences is rarely publicly available, but recent work demonstrates that 
private equity firms are more likely to do this than other owners when the 
company is in bankruptcy proceedings. Hotchkiss et al., supra note 54, at 
23–24. 
185 See Davis, supra note 9, at 89 (suggesting that the “strip and flip” private 
equity trend is evidence that “despite the ability of private-equity sponsors 
to take a long-term view, they will not always do so”). 
186 See infra Part V for limitations on private equity’s gatekeeping role. 
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private equity firms to serve as effective gatekeepers.187 Concern for 
their long-term reputation should thus cause private equity firms to 
exert efforts to mitigate the agency costs of debt in their portfolio 
companies. 
In game-theory terms, private equity firms should behave 
quite differently in repeated game with creditors than in an end 
game.188 Appendix A hereto provides a theoretical model 
demonstrating this result, and the following simple numerical 
example illustrates the point. Assume that a private equity fund uses 
$20 million of its own pooled cash to acquire a company, and that 
creditors lend an additional $80 million, such that the enterprise 
value of the company is $100 million at the outset. Assume next that 
due to an exogenous shock, the value of the company immediately 
declines to $80 million. At this juncture, the company is exactly on 
the border of insolvency, having just enough to repay the creditors 
(assuming no interest or fees have accrued, for simplicity).  
The company can now be viewed as having only two 
options. The first, Option A, is simply to use the remaining $80 
million to repay the creditors in full. The second, Option B, is to take 
on a risky project on the slim chance that it will turn things around 
for the company. Assume, for example, that the project has a 10% 
chance of increasing the company’s value to $500 million, and a 
90% chance of decreasing the company’s value to $0. Option A is 
great for creditors, who get all of their money back, but bad for the 
private equity firm, which will lose its entire investment in the 
company. Option B, on the other hand, is disastrous for both 
creditors and the company itself, because the expected value of the 
firm is only $50 million. From the private equity firm’s perspective, 
however, Option B is actually more appealing than Option A; even 
though the most likely outcome is that the company’s value will be 
entirely wiped out, there is still some possibility that the private 
equity firm will recover its investment and, in fact, profit from it. 
In an end-game situation, then, the private equity firm would 
unquestionably pick the “bet-the-farm” Option B, even though it 
would leave creditors with nothing. However, in a repeated game, 
the private equity firm will have at least some incentive to select 
                                                            
187 See Coffee, supra note 99, at 309 (highlighting the importance of 
differing incentives between the gatekeeper and the companies it serves).  
188 See generally Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The 
Mysterious Race to the Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. & POLICY REV. 381 (2005) 
(analyzing incentives for managers in repeat game and end game scenarios).   
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Option A. Even though the private equity firm loses everything—
with certainty—under Option A, by repaying creditors in full, it will 
preserve its reputation in the debt markets and thus its ability to 
borrow on good terms in future deals. 
In sum, private equity firms can be characterized as repeat 
players in the debt markets, while standalone companies more 
closely resemble end-game players.189 As shown in the previous 
example and in Appendix A, this should have a material impact on 
the respective debt terms that private equity firms are able to 
negotiate with creditors. 
 
b. Reputation with Specific 
Creditors 
 
The previous section demonstrated how a private equity 
firm’s reputation among creditors as a whole serves to mitigate the 
agency costs of debt and leads to more favorable debt terms for its 
portfolio companies. Yet private equity firms are repeat players not 
only with respect to creditors in general, but more importantly with 
respect to a small group of specifically identifiable creditors: the 
handful of major U.S. commercial and investment banks that 
specialize in arranging or underwriting leveraged loans.190   
The incentive not to cheat is much stronger when a private 
equity firm deals with the same creditor (the “relationship bank”) 
over and over again than when it deals with a different creditor each 
time, because the relationship bank should always know when the 
private equity firm has cheated it and immediately punish the private 
equity firm the next time it attempts to borrow. When different 
creditors are involved each time, however, the incentive not to cheat 
will depend on whether anyone other than the borrower and creditor 
                                                            
189 Of course, the dichotomy between the two groups is not nearly so stark 
in practice. The most seasoned corporate issuers borrow fairly regularly, 
giving them at least some reputational stakes as well. The more accurate 
depiction is of a scale of reputational incentives, with the most established 
private equity firms lying at one end, start-up companies and insolvent 
companies on the other, and large-cap standalone corporate issuers that are 
frequent borrowers somewhere in the middle.  
190 The U.S. market for lead arranger positions is highly concentrated, 
dominated by the largest investment and commercial banks. Shivdasani & 
Wang, supra note 152, at 1306. 
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at issue can discern whether cheating has occurred191 and, if so, how 
quickly that information is disseminated to other creditors.192 Thus, 
by virtue of their relationships with a very small set of specific 
banks, private equity firms have an even stronger incentive to 
maintain reputations for good borrowing behavior, and creditors 
have more reason to rely on such reputations.193 
Table 2 below illustrates the importance of private equity 
firms’ relationships with specific banks. It lists the aggregate number 
and amount of credit facilities negotiated by KKR with the largest 
U.S. banks.194 The data was compiled using Thomson Reuters LPC’s 
                                                            
191 In the gatekeeper context, Frank Partnoy makes a similar point when 
noting that the reputation market is not efficient because it is difficult to 
observe the reputational intermediaries’ effort and to correctly link it to 
companies’ performance. Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A 
Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365, 366–67 (2004). 
192 A more precise illustration follows. Imagine that a private equity firm 
expects to borrow at times T1 and T2, and that the group of potential 
creditors includes A, B, C, etc. Assume the private equity firm borrows 
from A at T1. If it is likely to borrow from A again at T2, it will have a very 
strong incentive not to cheat A at T1 because A is highly likely to know that 
it has been cheated and to retaliate by offering worse loan terms (such as a 
higher interest rate) at T2. If, however, the private equity firm is equally 
likely to borrow from a different creditor at T2, its incentive not to cheat at 
T1 will be weaker because (1) the information concerning the private equity 
firm’s actions at T1 may not have reached the other creditors by T2 and (2), 
even if it has, these creditors may not know with certainty whether such 
actions amounted to cheating by the private equity firm. (For example, if 
the private equity firm’s portfolio company defaulted on its debt between T1 
and T2, the creditors may not be able to discern whether this was a result of 
misconduct by the private equity firm or of some event outside of the 
private equity firm’s control). Thus, repeat interactions with the very same 
lender make it even less likely that the private equity firm will cheat. 
193 For a rare example in the corporate law literature noting the reputational 
advantages of private equity, see Whitehead, supra note 15, at 666–67 
(explaining that “[t]he private equity market is principally comprised of a 
limited group of participants that interact frequently, suggesting that a 
reputation as a ‘good’ borrower can have substantial and positive economic 
consequences”). For an empirical demonstration of the effect of repeated 
interactions between the borrower and the same lender, see generally 
Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13.   
194 Note that Table 2 covers only senior loans; if high-yield bonds were 
included the number of transactions with each bank group and aggregate 
amount would be significantly higher. 
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DealScan database of syndicated loans.195 
 
Table 2. KKR Bank Relationships: 1986-2011 
 
Most frequent lead (or co-lead) arrangers for bank debt facilities of 
KKR-sponsored companies from March 1, 1986 through May 30, 
2011. Includes only facilities denominated in U.S. dollars and 







JP Morgan 154 $104,723,000,000 
Deutsche Bank 141 $86,223,298,224 
Citibank 98 $96,324,487,889 
Bank of America 86 $50,909,835,183 
Credit Suisse 68 $67,377,466,643 
Goldman Sachs 56 $64,312,858,906 
 
Between 1986 and 2011, KKR-sponsored companies entered 
into at least 154 credit facilities in which JP Morgan was the lead or 
co-lead arranger, for a total of nearly $105 billion.196 It is thus easy to 
understand why KKR’s historic track record with JP Morgan affects 
the loan terms that KKR is able to obtain from JP Morgan in future 
deals, and provides strong incentives for KKR to ensure that JP 
Morgan is happy with the credit performance of KKR’s portfolio 
companies.197 
                                                            
195 DealScan Report, THOMSON REUTERS LPC, https://www.loanpricing. 
com/products/solutions-for-the-primary-market/loanconnectordealscan/ 
(datasets on file with author). 
196 Id. 
197 The literature on relationship banking is extensive, and focuses on the 
fact that repeat interactions between the same borrower and lender reduce 
information asymmetries between them, thereby allowing for better loan 
terms (or even for loans to be made in the first place). E.g., Sreedhar T. 
Bharath, Sandeep Dahiya, Anthony Saunders & Anand Srinivasan, Lending 
Relationships and Loan Contract Terms, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1141, 1141–42 
(2011). What is important to remember is that private equity firms are not 
themselves borrowers, and that (roughly speaking), we can think of each 
borrowing that a private equity firm negotiates as being for a totally 
different company. Thus, the traditional benefits for the lender from repeat 
lending (increasing familiarity with the company’s operations, management, 
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C. Private Equity Firms’ Ability to Mitigate Agency 
Costs 
 
In order to act as gatekeepers, it is not sufficient that private 
equity firms have the incentive to mitigate agency costs; they must, 
of course, also have the ability to do so. Private equity firms satisfy 
this third gatekeeping requirement in that they are able to mitigate 
(though not eliminate) adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
with respect to their portfolio companies. 
 
1. Adverse Selection   
 
To keep things simple, imagine that a company approaches a 
single creditor and asks for a loan at the creditor’s going rate for 
similar loans to companies in that industry and market. From the 
creditor’s perspective, the problem of adverse selection is perhaps 
better described as three problems: (1) the statistical likelihood that 
the borrower is of “low” quality in the absence of any knowledge 
about its individual characteristics (which is determined by the 
percentage of low-quality companies among all those that approach 
the creditor to borrow funds); (2) the difficulty of determining the 
borrower’s actual quality, assuming a perfectly trustworthy borrower 
(which is determined by factors such as the quality of the borrower’s 
financial information, the ability to make accurate projections based 
on such information, and the ability to glean intangible features of 
the company, etc.); and (3) the possibility that the borrower might 
not be trustworthy, that is, that it might affirmatively misrepresent its 
quality to the creditor. Private equity firms have the ability to 
ameliorate each of these three facets of borrower adverse selection.   
With respect to the first problem, private equity firms may 
increase the baseline probability that the borrower is of high quality 
through their skill in picking companies to acquire. Because they are 
in the business of making frequent acquisitions, it is at least plausible 
that they develop over time an expertise in identifying higher-quality 
companies.198 And if private equity firms are able to bring higher-
                                                                                                                              
etc.) simply do not apply here. Instead, what makes the difference here is 
the gatekeeping role played by the private equity firm. 
198 Just how plausible this advantage in picking companies is depends on 
how we define “higher-quality” or “better” companies. One possibility is 
that the company has been undervalued by the market (e.g., its growth rate 
2013-2014 PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS AS GATEKEEPERS 159 
 
quality companies to creditors in the first place, creditors will reward 
them with better debt terms.199 Thus, the private equity borrowing 
advantage may owe in part to private equity firms’ reputations for 
picking better companies ex ante. If so, private equity firms perform 
not only the traditional, passive certification role of gatekeepers, but 
also an active selection or filtering role as well.  
This role also explains how private equity firms can 
minimize the second problem for creditors: the difficulty of 
determining a given borrower’s quality. In order to pick better 
companies, private equity firms must first accurately pinpoint a 
company’s quality. Prior to making an acquisition, a private equity 
firm gleans significant information about the company through its 
extensive due diligence efforts (such as meeting repeatedly with 
management and engaging top-tier auditors and law firms to conduct 
due diligence).200 As the intended sole owner of the target, the 
private equity firm’s stakes are higher than creditors’ in determining 
the target’s quality. Post-acquisition, the private equity firm controls 
the company and has direct access to all company information.201 
Together these should translate into an ability to gauge the value of a 
company that is superior to one based solely on the information that 
borrowers provide to creditors.202  
                                                                                                                              
will be higher than what its share price currently reflects). The second is 
that the company has a superior ability to bear a heavy debt load (e.g., it 
will generate a large, predictable cash-flow, with minimal volatility). 
Private equity firms are far more likely to have an advantage over the rest of 
the market under the second definition, which incidentally is the measure of 
quality that creditors are far more concerned about. Because private equity 
acquisitions require a very high proportion of debt financing, private equity 
firms—unlike most acquirers—are almost exclusively focused on 
companies’ ability to generate cash. Harry Cendrowski & Adam A. 
Wadecki, Private Equity Governance Model, in PRIVATE EQUITY: HISTORY, 
GOVERNANCE, AND OPERATIONS, 163, 170 (2d ed. 2012). This is why 
private equity valuations are always expressed as a multiple of EBITDA. It 
is less likely, however, that private equity firms could have an advantage in 
identifying undervalued companies, particularly in the large-cap area, where 
companies are typically auctioned off to several bidders in a highly 
competitive process. Bartlett, supra note 52, at 2016, 2018. 
199 Whitehead, supra note 15, at 665–66.  
200 Spindler, supra note 133, at 325. 
201 Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 223–24.  
202 Of course, private equity’s advantage in this regard should be inversely 
related to the availability of information about the companies at issue. The 
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Finally, private equity firms are able to prevent the third type 
of adverse selection: actual misrepresentations to creditors. As sole 
shareholders of their portfolio companies, private equity firms have 
direct control of management and, for the reasons discussed above, 
will be able to recognize when management is misrepresenting 
information.203 
 
2. Moral Hazard 
 
The ability to mitigate moral hazard in their portfolio 
companies is one of the key benefits of private equity firms’ status as 
“insider” gatekeepers: they can limit misconduct by management 
because, unlike creditors, they have direct and continuous control 
over the borrower.204 As sole shareholders, they are able to prevent 
management from taking actions that harm the company’s creditors, 
just as they are able to prevent management from misrepresenting 
the company’s quality. 
Private equity firms have an additional and highly valuable 
advantage over most borrowers in controlling moral hazard. If, 
despite best intentions, its portfolio company has defaulted—or is at 
risk of defaulting—on its debt, a private equity firm can put 
                                                                                                                              
more information about a company is available to the public, the less likely 
it is that private equity firms will find things that others have not. Thus, 
private equity’s role in mitigating adverse selection may well be greater for 
smaller, private companies (in the middle-market or lower-middle market) 
than for large public companies. 
203 Davis, supra note 9, at 85.  
204 Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 251. However, that is not to say 
that creditors do not have any control over their borrowers. There is a well-
established literature demonstrating that creditors impact their borrowers’ 
corporate governance because they are able to exercise some measure of 
control over them. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, 
Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1209 (2005–2006) (criticizing traditional approaches to corporate 
governance that ignore the large and growing role of creditors); George G. 
Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate 
Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073 (1995) (offering an alternative theory of 
corporate governance that encompasses the interactions occurring between 
stakeholders and managers); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: 
The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 115 (2009) (arguing that “private lender influence 
significantly constrains managerial discretion”). 
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additional equity into the borrower to avoid or remedy the default.205 
The latter option simply is not feasible for the shareholders of a 
public company, for example, yet it is a major benefit from a 
creditor’s perspective in reducing moral hazard concerns. 
In order to appreciate the value of private equity’s role in 
mitigating the agency costs of debt, recall that private equity-backed 
companies are far more leveraged than their standalone company 
counterparts.206 The greater a company’s leverage, the more severe 
its potential for both adverse selection and moral hazard.207 Adverse 
selection is exacerbated because higher-leveraged companies pay 
higher interest rates to compensate lenders for the additional risk of 
default.208 Higher interest rates in turn attract lower-quality 
borrowers (who have less to lose than higher-quality borrowers).209 
Moral hazard is exacerbated because shareholders’ returns from 
taking actions that divert wealth from the company’s creditors are 
increased when they have less of their own money at stake.210 All 
else being equal, therefore, a company with greater leverage imposes 
greater agency costs on lenders. Private equity firms’ ability and 
incentives to mitigate these costs should therefore contribute to a 
material borrowing advantage in the market. 
 
IV. Measuring Private Equity’s Gatekeeping Performance 
 
The previous Part III and Appendix A demonstrate 
conceptually why private equity firms should be expected to act as 
gatekeepers in the debt markets. This Part IV examines what can 
(and cannot) be said about whether this is true in practice. Part A 
summarizes the limited, indirect empirical evidence currently 
available to support the claims of this Article and discusses the 
difficulties that preclude direct empirical support. Part B briefly 
advances three additional hypotheses—unrelated to the gatekeeper 
effect—for why private equity-owned companies might have a 
borrowing advantage over standalone companies.   
 
                                                            
205 Hotchkiss et al., supra note 54, at 23–24.  
206 Davis, supra note 9, at 91. 
207 For a formal proof, see infra Appendix A, Section 1.  
208 See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 30, at 45; Davis, supra note 9, at 91.  
209 Choi & Triantis, supra note 118, at 55–56.  
210 Smith & Warner, supra note 134, at 118–19.  




Part II of this Article advanced two claims: first, driven by 
their reputational incentives, private equity firms act as gatekeepers 
in the debt markets; and second, a private equity-backed company 
should obtain more favorable debt terms than a non-sponsored 
company, all else being equal. In order to conclude that private 
equity firms act as gatekeepers, then, we would want evidence first, 
that private equity-sponsored companies get better debt terms, ceteris 
paribus, and, second, that reputation is the cause of this borrowing 
advantage. The available evidence (and lacunae) for each are 
discussed in turn below. 
 
1. Better Loan Terms for Private Equity? 
 
Practitioners and the financial press take it as a given that 
private equity firms obtain debt terms for their portfolio companies 
that others simply cannot match.211 Determining whether private 
equity-owned companies get better loan terms than comparable 
standalone companies would thus seem to be a relatively 
straightforward matter. In practice, however, direct empirical 
evidence is elusive because loans to private equity-backed and 
standalone companies cannot be sufficiently matched. There is too 
little overlap in the borrowing amounts212 and types213 of highly-
                                                            
211 See, e.g., Matthew Benjamin, Deal Mania, Shades of the ‘80s: The 
Leveraged Buyout Is Back in Vogue, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 18, 
2005, at 40; Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Money Binge: What Lies Behind All 
the Cash Driving the Record Run of Buyouts?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at 
H1 (describing how the willingness of banks to “lend huge sums on friendly 
terms” has contributed to the increase in buyouts).  
212 See generally Bartlett, supra note 52. Highly-leveraged public 
companies do of course exist, but they tend to cluster in very specific 
industries, such as airlines and cable companies, or are highly leveraged not 
by design, but as a result of deteriorating performance (so-called “fallen 
angels”). See Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg & Weisbach, supra note 171, 
at 32.  
213 Private equity-backed companies are primarily financed with “bank 
debt.” Public companies, for example, often opt for a different mix of debt 
financing types. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 141. The largest 
public companies will often issue commercial paper (for very short-term 
borrowing) and public bonds (for long-term borrowing), in lieu of bank 
debt. Cem Demiroglu & Christopher James, 35 J. BANKING & FIN. 775, 780 
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leveraged private equity-backed companies and their less-leveraged 
standalone counterparts.214 Simply put, the assumptions underlying 
the “all else being equal” proviso are not satisfied.215 
Paradoxically, however, the lack of data to support a direct 
empirical proof of the claim could be taken as evidence in favor of 
                                                                                                                              
(2011). What bank debt they do employ is used for the purpose of providing 
back-up liquidity, and is therefore generally in the form of an undrawn 
revolving credit facility, rather than the term loan favored by LBO 
companies. Amir Sufi, Bank Lines of Credit in Corporate Finance: An 
Empirical Analysis, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1057, 1067 (2009).  
214 One would expect the ideal test to be a comparison of the debt terms of a 
given company immediately prior to, and after, its acquisition by a private 
equity fund. Yet in virtually all instances, leveraged buyouts involve a 
major increase in the target company’s leverage, which of course affects the 
terms of the debt independently of the company’s ownership. See Bartlett, 
supra note 52, at 2014–16.  
215 The most obvious problematic assumption is that of identical leverage 
between private equity-backed companies and standalone companies, as 
discussed in the previous notes. A second assumption that proves 
problematic is that the private equity-owned company and the standalone 
company have the same amount of information available to creditors. Thus, 
a potential rebuttal to the claim would be that, at least for public companies, 
the void in monitoring is partially addressed by the greater availability of 
information about the borrower. Public companies are required to disclose 
material information publicly (and promptly), whereas private company 
information is less readily available. Healy & Palepu, supra note 127, at 
411–12. Even assuming that the information required to be disclosed by 
public companies is especially useful for monitoring loan performance, the 
information gap between private equity-backed companies and public 
companies is decreasing, particularly with respect to the largest LBO 
portfolio companies. First, many of these companies issue not only bank 
debt, but also publicly-traded bonds, and therefore, subject themselves to 
the same reporting rules as public companies. Bartlett, supra note 88, at 15. 
Second, lenders generally impose financial and other reporting obligations 
in the credit agreement that are designed to approximate public company 
reporting, particularly with large borrowers. RICHARD WIGHT, WARREN 
COOKE & RICHARD GRAY, THE LSTA’S COMPLETE CREDIT AGREEMENT 
GUIDE 310–18 (2009). Third, the growth of syndication has been 
accompanied by the introduction of loan ratings by the major national rating 
agencies and detailed reporting on loan market in trade journals and the 
general financial media, all of which have narrowed the information gap 
between loans to private and public companies. STANDARD & POOR’S, A 
GUIDE TO THE LOAN MARKET 11 (2011), available at https://www. 
lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LoanMarketguide.pdf.  
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the claim. The paucity of highly-leveraged loans to standalone 
companies suggests that there is little appetite by lenders to provide 
so much leverage and on such favorable terms to such companies—
the market simply does not support it.216 Consistent with the 
gatekeeper hypothesis, private equity firms enable companies to do 
something that—due to the excessive agency costs—they otherwise 
could not: borrow massive amounts of debt on highly favorable 
terms.217 
Time-series data fare somewhat better than cross-sectional 
data in pointing at a private equity borrowing advantage.218 Over 
recent periods, for example, the evolution in debt terms seems to 
have been relatively more favorable to private equity-backed 
companies than to other companies.219 During the same 2004 to 2007 
period during which private equity acquisitions surged, creditors’ 
lending standards loosened dramatically; that is, debt terms improved 
for all borrowers.220 Yet the leveraged loan segment of the market, 
which is dominated by private equity-related borrowing, benefited 
disproportionately.221   
 
2. What’s Reputation Got to Do with It? 
 
Even assuming a private equity borrowing advantage, there 
is still the matter of determining the extent to which it is due to 
                                                            
216 Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2495 (acknowledging the lack of a 
true comparison set for loans issued by private equity-owned companies). 
217 Id. (explaining that “LBO firms’ repeated interactions with banks create 
opportunities to reduce the costs associated with information 
asymmetries”). In fairness, however, this does not rule out the alternative 
explanation that standalone companies simply do not want to take on as 
much debt as private equity-owned companies. The debate over the optimal 
capital structure for companies is still largely unresolved. See Bartlett, 
supra note 52, at 1985–91.   
218 Demiroglu & James, supra note 165, at 308–09, 315.  
219 E.g., Christenfeld & Goodstein, supra note 163; Foley, supra note 163, 
at 12.  
220 Demiroglu & James, supra note 165, at 308 (“[S]ignificant declines, 
after 2002, in the proportion of traditional bank loans and the number and 
tightness of financial covenants associated with leveraged loans . . . suggest 
a decline in the intensity and importance of bank monitoring.”).  
221 Id. at 315 (explaining that “the decline in importance of covenants in 
loans to private equity firms only partly reflects an overall trend in credit 
market conditions”).  
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private equity firms’ reputation for mitigating agency costs.222 
Happily, recent empirical finance work demonstrates that private 
equity firm reputation positively affects the terms on which portfolio 
companies are able to borrow.223    
First, Cem Demiroglu and Christopher James find that more 
established private equity firms obtain better financing terms for 
their portfolio companies than less well-established ones.224 Their 
findings hold under various measures of firm reputation (years in 
operation, assets under management, etc.).225 Because private equity 
firms are not liable for their portfolio companies’ debts, the result 
that private equity sponsors’ reputation impacts their portfolio 
companies’ financing terms is surprising. The explanation offered 
here, of course, is that creditors reward private equity firms for their 
efforts at mitigating adverse selection and moral hazard in their 
portfolio companies. 
Second, Victoria Ivashina and Anna Kovner find that the 
more a private equity firm interacts with the same lead arranger, the 
better its portfolio companies’ debt terms will be.226 In our terms, 
private equity-backed companies obtain better debt terms when they 
are in repeated games with creditors than in end games.227 Granted, 
the effect on debt terms from such repeated interactions could also be 
due to private benefits that they afford the lead arranger (such as 
cross-selling opportunities),228 yet the authors find that the effect 
remains even after accounting for such benefits.229 Thus, the 
empirical results support the hypothesis that private equity firms’ 
reputations with lenders provide an advantage in debt terms.   
 
                                                            
222 A helpful test would be the comparison of management buyouts (MBOs) 
to leveraged buyouts (LBOs) because the former are akin to end-game 
financings, while the latter are repeated games. Thus, one would expect 
MBOs to obtain worse debt terms than LBOs. While anecdotal evidence 
suggests that this is indeed the case, the data on MBOs is insufficient for 
empirical testing of the claim. 
223 See generally Demiroglu & James, supra note 165; Ivashina & Kovner, 
supra note 13.  
224 Demiroglu & James, supra note 165, at 329.  
225 Id. at 316–17.  
226 Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2495.  
227 Id. at 2480, 2495.  
228 See infra Part V.B.2. 
229 Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2487.  
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B. Additional Hypotheses for Private Equity 
Borrowing Advantage 
 
One of the difficulties in isolating and measuring the effect 
of a private equity firm’s reputation on its portfolio companies’ 
financing terms is that additional plausible hypotheses exist to 
explain why private equity-backed companies might have a 
borrowing advantage over standalone companies. In addition to the 
gatekeeper effect, the hypotheses include the following: (1) private 
equity-related loans are more liquid; (2) private equity firms get a 
volume discount from the major banks that arrange or underwrite 
their debt; and (3) private equity firms have a bargaining advantage 
in the debt markets.230  
 
1. Liquidity  
 
If we loosen the assumptions and no longer hold leverage 
constant, we find that private equity-owned companies borrow 
substantially more than comparable standalone companies.231 This 
affects private equity-owned borrowers’ debt terms in two opposing 
ways. On the one hand, as discussed above, greater leverage gives 
rise to greater agency costs, and thus to greater credit risk.232 Yet on 
the other, the high leverage of private equity-related loans also 
provides one major benefit to creditors over less-leveraged loans, 
which is a lower liquidity risk.233 Contrary to all other U.S. capital 
markets (including the stock and bond markets), the riskiest assets 
are currently the most liquid in the corporate loan market.234 
Specifically, “leveraged loans,”235 which are the type favored by 
                                                            
230 These hypotheses will be discussed in greater detail in a companion 
piece to this Article. 
231 See generally Bartlett, supra note 52.  
232 Steven Drucker & Manju Puri, On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and 
Lending Relationships, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2835, 2836 (2009).  
233 YAGO & MCCARTHY, supra note 150, at 35–41. Liquidity can be thought 
of as the ease with which a loan can be sold to another lender. 
234 Drucker & Puri, supra note 232, at 2835 (explaining that the secondary 
loan market is unusual in that trading “is dominated by leveraged, risky 
loans,” unlike the public debt markets). 
235 “Leveraged loan” is the pleonastic term used to describe loans to highly-
leveraged borrowers. The technical definition of a leveraged loan is a matter 
of some debate, and is variously tied to loans with (1) interest rate margins 
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private equity-owned companies, are more liquid than loans made to 
borrowers with low leverage.236 
The basic impetus for this surprising phenomenon is that 
non-bank institutional lenders, which have rapidly taken the largest 
share of the market, are best suited to invest in a type of leveraged 
loan issued by private equity-firms (the eponymous “institutional” 
tranches), while the more traditional loans of investment grade 
borrowers are still funded almost exclusively by banks.237 With more 
lenders clamoring to fund private equity-related loans, the latter have 
become a highly liquid asset class, and are for this reason made on 
relatively better terms.  
 
                                                                                                                              
above a certain threshold or (2) credit ratings below a certain threshold. 
STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 215, at 29.  
236 YAGO & MCCARTHY, supra note 150, at 35–41.  
237 Id. at 18–22. The more technical explanation is as follows. Secondary 
trading began with the originating banks, which, in response to new bank 
capital requirements, sought ways to diversify their loan holdings and began 
applying portfolio theory consistently beginning in the early 1990s. 
STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 215, at 11. Changes to the mechanics of 
loan transfers followed rapidly, allowing for more efficient and rapid 
transfer and pricing of loans. YAGO & MCCARTHY, supra note 150, at 23–
24. These changes included the founding of a trade association for the 
syndication and trading of loans (the LSTA), as well as the introduction of 
mark-to-market loan pricing, loan ratings by the national rating agencies, 
and standardized forms for the assignment of loans. Allison A. Taylor, The 
LSTA and Its Role in the Promotion of the Corporate Loan Assets Class, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING 61–75 (Allison 
Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2006). Thereafter, the watershed moment 
was the SEC’s promulgation of Rule 144A, which, among other things, 
allowed non-bank investors to begin trading syndicated loans. Thomas & 
Wang, supra note 155, at 304–05. New classes of institutional lenders, 
eventually including structured finance products such as CLOs, swarmed 
into the market, with very different goals and constraints than traditional 
banks. YAGO & MCCARTHY, supra note 150, at 19–22. The end result was a 
vast new supply of lenders in the loan market, heavily tilted toward 
leveraged loans. Id. at 25. While leveraged loans are heavily traded, it is 
still the case that, overall, most syndicated loans are not traded on the 
secondary market. Drucker & Puri, supra note 232, at 2853 (acknowledging 
that only 20% of all syndicated loans are sold in the secondary market). 
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2. Volume Discount  
 
As repeat players in the debt and acquisition markets, private 
equity firms get the benefit of a form of volume discount from the 
large commercial and investment banks that syndicate and/or 
underwrite their debt.238 Such banks covet relationships with private 
equity firms, which provide them with both substantial transaction 
fee income from the debt financings239 and also cross-selling 
opportunities for more lucrative services, including securities 
underwriting and mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) advisory 
services.240 In return for this additional income, the lead banks will 
provide private equity-owned companies with more favorable loan 
terms.241  
 
3. Bargaining Advantage 
 
Through their repeated interactions with creditors, private 
equity firms become more sophisticated customers in the debt 
markets than standalone companies, and should therefore command 
more bargaining power than standalone companies in negotiating 
debt terms.242 Sophistication translates here into a twofold bargaining 
advantage of superior information and superior skill. First, private 
equity firms have an informational advantage over less frequent 
players in the debt markets as to what financing terms are currently 
the “market” terms.243 Because most financings are not made public, 
a standalone company will have far less knowledge of market terms 
than a private equity firm that is constantly in the debt markets for 
                                                            
238 Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2462. 
239 Viral V. Acharya, Julian Franks & Henri Servaes, Private Equity: Boom 
and Bust?, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 44, 52 (2007). 
240 Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2462, 2464. 
241 Regarding the transaction fee income, it is worth noting that as the loan 
syndication market exploded, the fee component of a lender’s return from a 
loan has become relatively more important because (1) the lead arranger 
might retain only a very small portion of the original loan and (2) the 
portion retained by the lead arranger can be more easily diversified now. 
Recent work finds that the lead arranger for LBO financing typically retains 
only 5–10% of the loan. Id. at 2469.  
242 Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg & Weisbach, supra note 171, at 2. Note 
that this assumes market power on both the borrower and lender sides of the 
market. 
243 Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 140–41. 
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one of its portfolio companies.244 Private equity firms can and do use 
their market knowledge to negotiate for better debt terms.245 Second, 
private equity firms should be expected to develop greater skill in 
sourcing and negotiating large financings using resources such as 
their extensive bank contacts and their experience with ever-
changing finance structures and terms. Such skill manifests itself 
notably in the frequent innovations in debt terms that originate with 
private equity-related financings.246 
Thus, gatekeeping by private equity firms need not be the 
sole explanation for their ability to obtain highly favorable loan 
terms for their portfolio companies; further work is needed to 
determine the relative importance of each explanation.  
 
V. Grading Private Equity’s Gatekeeping Performance 
 
A. Limitations on Private Equity’s Gatekeeping 
 
While private equity firms can perform a valuable 
gatekeeping role in the debt markets, they are not a perfect cure for 
the conflicts between borrowers and lenders. Reputation mitigates, 
but does not eliminate, agency costs in a market.247 Thus, we would 
want to know not only how private equity firms are able to act as 
gatekeepers (as discussed in Part III), but also the particular 
conditions under which they are likely to be reliable or unreliable 
gatekeepers. This sub-part identifies the major limitations on private 
equity firms’ gatekeeping performance. Per the framework 
                                                            
244 See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 30, at 59 (explaining “[p]rivate 
equity firms also rely heavily on confidential information to finalize bids 
before the competition is aware a target company is up for sale”).  
245 Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg & Weisbach, supra note 171, at 2.  
246 In the most recent wave of activity alone, private equity firms introduced 
or expanded several highly innovative (and borrower-favorable) loan terms 
and structures such as covenant-lite loans, equity cures, “yank-a-bank” 
provisions, PIK toggle loans, second-lien loans, amend-and-extend rights, 
partial refinancing rights, institutional tranches, accordion facilities, and so 
forth. Demiroglu & James, supra note 165, at 307; STANDARD & POOR’S, 
supra note 215, at 25–27; Wight, supra note 28, at 218, 387. 
247 In the case of the prototypical gatekeeper, accounting firms, one need 
only consider the epic corporate accounting scandals from the early 2000s 
to be convinced that reputation is not a perfect panacea. See, e.g., John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57 
BUS. LAW. 1403, 1405 (2001–2002). 
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introduced in Part II, they are divided into those that limit private 
equity firms’ ability to act as gatekeepers and those that limit their 
incentive to act as gatekeepers. 
At the outset, however, it is worth recalling that reputational 
harm is the sole incentive that prompts private equity firms to fulfill 
their gatekeeping role.248 Other gatekeepers may be compelled to act 
as such not only through market forces, but also by law.249 In 
contrast, private equity firms are pure market-based gatekeepers.     
Nor do private equity firms typically assume any contractual 
liability to bond themselves to their gatekeeping role.250 Although 
private equity firms negotiate their portfolio companies’ debt with 
creditors, the resulting contractual relationship is exclusively 
between each portfolio company and its creditors, with rare 
exceptions.251 Private equity’s gatekeeping in the debt markets is 
solely driven by reputation, which is subject to well-recognized 
weaknesses in constraining company behavior.252 
 
1. Limitations on Private Equity’s 
Gatekeeping Ability 
 
a. Within-firm Agency Costs: 
Disloyal Agents  
 
The first set of limitations on private equity firms’ 
gatekeeping are the agency costs within the gatekeeping firm itself. 
The interests of individual employees, partners, or even divisions of 
a firm (such as maximizing their compensation, prestige, etc.) may 
diverge from the interest of the firm as a whole in preserving its 
                                                            
248 See Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 239–40 (explaining why 
private equity firms act to prevent reputational harm).  
249 See Kraakman, supra note 97, at 54.  
250 Private equity funds resist guaranteeing their portfolio companies’ debt 
largely for tax reasons. Much, if not most, of the private equity investor 
base is composed of tax-exempt organizations (such as pension funds or 
university endowments) and foreign institutions, both of which would face 
adverse tax consequences if the funds were to provide such guarantees. See 
26 U.S.C. §§ 511, 163(j) (2006); APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 3, at 13.  
251 Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2469 (explaining that private 
equity firms are not liable for their portfolio companies’ debts other than to 
the extent of their initial equity investment). 
252 See generally Coffee, supra note 247. 
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reputation.253 The largest U.S. accounting firms exemplify this 
tension. Typically, the interests of the firm would best be served by 
refusing to endorse unusually aggressive accounting by one of its 
clients because the loss in future firm income from the resulting 
reputational harm should outweigh the incremental income generated 
by that particular client.254 Yet the individual audit partner serving 
that client might be hard-pressed to say no to the client; his or her job 
may well depend on the firm’s retaining that client.255  
In the private equity context, a similar problem arises 
because individual private equity professionals’ compensation is 
more heavily-weighted toward the deals that they help negotiate and 
close. One could imagine situations in which they were better off 
misleading creditors so as to get a deal done on otherwise 
unattainably good terms.   
But this problem may be less severe with private equity 
firms than with traditional gatekeepers. The relatively small size of 
private equity firms256 compared to accounting firms, investment 
banks, and rating agencies, has three positive implications. Unlike 
the behemoths of the gatekeeping world, private equity firms should 
be able to monitor their professionals more closely and perhaps more 
readily convey to them the interests of the firm.257 Second, the 
pronounced intra-firm departmental conflicts of interest that exist in 
the larger gatekeeping organizations are unlikely to develop in 
smaller private equity firms.258 Finally, individual private equity 
professionals’ compensation will be more closely tied to the fortunes 
of the firm as a whole than in a larger organization (since each will 
tend to have a greater share of the overall profits), thereby ensuring 
                                                            
253 See id. at 1405 (“Despite the clear logic of the gatekeeper rationale, 
experience over the 1990s suggests that professional gatekeepers do 
acquiesce in managerial fraud, even though the apparent reputational losses 
seem to dwarf the gains to be made from the individual client.”). 
254 Coffee, supra note 99, at 310–11.  
255 Id. at 316 (describing that analysts and auditors are “‘reputational 
intermediaries,’ whose desire to be perceived as credible and objective may 
often be subordinated to their desire to retain and please” clients).  
256 Jensen, supra note 73, at 69–70.  
257 Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 224.  
258 A classic example is the case of securities analysts being pressured to 
give misleading company reviews by the investment bankers within the 
same firm. Coffee, supra note 99, at 315–18.  
172 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 33 
 
that their incentives are more closely aligned.259 
 
b. Difficulties in Obtaining 
Company Information 
 
Private equity’s role in minimizing adverse selection 
depends on its ability to obtain company information that is not 
readily available to creditors.260 Ironically, when private equity is 
experiencing a peak of activity, its information advantage is at its 
weakest. During a hot acquisition market, sellers have greater 
bargaining power relative to acquirers.261 This allows sellers to 
substantially shorten the target’s auction timeline, to provide very 
limited information about the target to bidders, and to limit bidders’ 
opportunity to perform their own due diligence (such as by meeting 
with the company’s management).262 
Under such conditions, a private equity firm may be less 
successful at mitigating adverse selection for two reasons. First, it 
will have gathered less information about the target company than it 
would have under normal market conditions, and thus may not be 
able to reliably certify its quality to creditors. Second, a hot 
acquisition market is a more competitive one, in which private equity 
firms are less likely to find undervalued companies; anything that 
they identify as a diamond in the rough is likely to be a fake. 
 
2. Limitations on Private Equity’s 
Gatekeeping Incentives 
 
a. Market Bubbles 
 
During a market bubble, the value of a gatekeeper’s 
reputational capital declines.263 Investors experience so much 
pressure to invest that they disregard or give less weight to 
                                                            
259 Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 8, at 131; Masulis & Thomas, supra 
note 71, at 227–28.  
260 Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 13, at 2466.  
261 See Ivashina & Sun, supra note 135, at 506–07. 
262 See Lisa Read Blanco & Jaron Brown, How to Auction Your Company 
 to a Private Equity Fund, EXECUTIVE COUNSEL, July/Aug. 2007, available 
at http://www.kslaw.com/Library/publication/ExecCounsel_BlancoBrown. 
pdf. 
263 Coffee, supra note 247, at 1412; Coffee, supra note 99, at 310.  
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gatekeepers’ pronouncements.264 The result is increased 
permissiveness by gatekeepers because the cost of being permissive 
(reputational harm) has declined relative to the benefits.265 
By most accounts, a bubble did indeed occur in the debt 
markets during the 2005 to 2007 lead-up to the global financial 
crisis.266 The market experienced a glut of capital267 from 
institutional investors chasing high returns and engaged in herding 
behavior,268 resulting in a surge in liquidity that coincided with the 
most recent private equity boom. Yet while many feared a 
devastating post-bubble wave of defaults by the highly-leveraged 
private equity-backed companies, as of 2013, we have yet to witness 
it.269 Nonetheless, it may still be the case that creditors were not 
adequately compensated for the level of risk that they assumed 
during the go-go-go period.270 
 
b. Rational Firm Decisions to 
Sacrifice Reputation 
 
Even assuming that all of a gatekeeper’s agents are perfectly 
loyal, there are circumstances in which the gatekeeper firm itself 
might still permit corporate misbehavior. A gatekeeper may 
rationally decide to deplete its reputational capital if doing so would 
maximize its expected profits.271 For example, an exogenous factor 
                                                            
264 See Coffee, supra note 99, at 329. 
265 Id. at 324.  
266 Acharya et al., supra note 239, at 45. 
267 The pre-crisis glut of capital in the debt markets has been variously 
attributed to Asian governmental surpluses, excess oil profits, and a surge in 
pension, foundation, and private wealth. Id. (citing Edward I. Altman, 
Global Debt Markets in 2007: New Paradigm or the Great Credit Bubble?, 
19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 17, 17 (2007)).  
268 E.g., Ivashina & Sun, supra note 135, at 502 (concluding that, contrary 
to the predictions of an efficient market, the demand curve for syndicated 
corporate loans is downward sloping, such that exogenous shifts in the 
supply of capital to the market affect loan valuations). 
269 Christenfeld & Goodstein, supra note 163 (stating that “default rates are 
generally at their lowest in many years”); Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 
8, at 129 (finding a lower default rate for their sample of private equity-
owned companies than for all U.S. corporate bond issuers from 1980–
2002). 
270 Shivdasani & Wang, supra note 152, at 1324. 
271 Partnoy, supra note 191, at 367. 
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may change the calculus for the gatekeeping firm in such a way that 
permissiveness becomes the optimal strategy, notwithstanding the 
long-term harm to the firm’s reputation. In the private equity context, 
one can derive plausible scenarios to that effect without much 
difficulty.   
First, when private equity firms recognize that they are at the 
end of a cycle of activity—for instance, because credit markets are 
drying up or target companies are overvalued—they might conclude 
that the benefit from misrepresentation or misconduct toward 
creditors outweighs the harm to their reputation, since they cannot be 
certain that they will survive until the next cycle of activity. 
Second, a private equity firm that is in the process of 
fundraising for its next fund may be particularly eager to quickly 
close an acquisition with its existing fund, rationally sacrificing some 
of its long-term reputation in exchange for a short-term boost in 
publicity.272  
Finally, we have the obvious point that private equity firms 
with less well-established reputations are more likely to be 
permissive. Upstart private equity firms have less reputational capital 
with creditors (and thus less to lose from putting it at risk) and more 





272 RASHIDA K. LA LANDE, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, PRIVATE 
EQUITY STRATEGIES FOR EXITING A LEVERAGED BUYOUT 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/ 
LaLande-PrivateEquityStrategiesforExitingaLeveragedBuyout.pdf. For a 
different account of the relationship between the timeline of a private equity 
fund and the likely outcome for creditors of its portfolio companies, see 
Hotchkiss et al., supra note 54, at 20 (arguing that a given portfolio 
company is less likely to default on its debt if the private equity fund was 
raised recently, because the fund has more undrawn capital and thus more 
ability to contribute additional equity to prevent a default). 
273 Meuleman et al., supra note 167, at 625 (arguing that “[b]ecause young 
PE companies have more incentives to prove themselves so as to establish a 
reputation, they are likely to take on more risky investment projects with 
higher potential outcomes”). Here again, the finding that more reputable 
private equity firms get better debt terms is particularly helpful. Demiroglu 
& James, supra note 165, at 306.  
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c. Conflicts of Interest 
 
Conflicts of interest are another well-recognized source of 
gatekeeping lapses.274 In the private equity sphere, a serious conflict 
of interest arises when a private equity firm is owned by a bank.275 In 
such cases, the bank can both acquire a company through the private 
equity fund and arrange and/or underwrite all of the company’s 
debt.276 Such a combination of roles has negative systemic effects277 
and, for our purposes, results in greater adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems toward the ultimate creditors in the syndicate. 
However, this conflict of interest should be precluded going forward 
by the Volcker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), which drastically 
limits the ability of U.S. banks to invest in or form private equity 
funds.278   
To conclude this sub-part, private equity firms face 
important limitations on their gatekeeping abilities and incentives, 
though they may fare better in this regard than larger, more 
traditional gatekeepers. The lessons for private equity firms and 
creditors are two-fold. First, private equity firms must pay close 
attention to their compensation practices to ensure that individual 
professionals are not incentivized to act against the firm’s interests 
by cheating creditors. Second, private equity firms will be less 
reliable gatekeepers during bubbles in both the M&A and debt 
markets, though this warning is by definition unlikely to be heeded 
by investors and creditors at the time.  
What can be said at this stage is that private equity firms 
should be expected to improve their portfolio companies’ behavior 
towards creditors to some degree, which will vary by firm and over 
                                                            
274 An oft-cited example is the fact that the debt rating agencies are paid by 
the companies that they are supposed to rate. E.g., John Patrick Hunt, Credit 
Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”: The Limits of 
Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 
2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 152 (2009). 
275 See Lily Fang, Victoria Ivashina & Josh Lerner, Combining Banking 
with Private Equity Investing, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 2139, 2140 (2009).  
276 Id.  
277 Id.  
278 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections 
of the U.S. Code) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].  
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time. The next sub-part briefly examines how private equity firms 
stack up against the other major gatekeepers in the debt markets: the 
credit rating agencies. 
 
B. A Word on Credit Rating Agencies 
 
The credit rating agencies are natural candidates for 
gatekeeping in the debt markets. Their sole stated function is to 
gauge the quality of debt instruments from the perspective of 
creditors.279 The two largest credit rating agencies, Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s, each have over a century of experience rating 
debt products.280 Presumably then, they have developed substantial 
expertise in assessing a borrower’s credit risk,281 and the reliability of 
their ratings is assured by their long-standing reputations. 
In practice, however, the rating agencies suffer from 
perennial problems that drastically limit the role of reputational 
capital in explaining their performance.282 Key criticisms include that 
rating agencies are highly concentrated, massive organizations283 that 
are subject to severe conflicts of interest.284 Further, rating agencies 
may not actually provide investors with new information on 
borrowers’ creditworthiness, but instead merely react to information 
                                                            
279 Hunt, supra note 274, at 114–15; see generally STANDARD & POOR’S, 
supra note 215.  
280 Ratings Definitions, MOODY’S, https://www.moodys.com/ratings-
process/Ratings-Definitions/002002 (last visited Nov. 22, 2013); About Us, 
STANDARD & POOR’S, http://www.standardandpoors.com/about-sp/main/ 
en/us (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).  
281 For a broad description of the proprietary methodology by which 
Standard & Poor’s rates corporate loans, see Standard & Poor’s, A Guide to 
the Loan Market, supra note 215, at 32–35. 
282 Hunt, supra note 274, at 113. But see Claire A. Hill, Regulating the 
Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 59–62 (2004) (describing how 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s hold 80% of the market share and are 
generally relied upon by firms); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of 
Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 26 
(2002) (“Rating agencies are already motivated to provide accurate and 
efficient ratings because their profitability is directly tied to reputation. 
Historical data confirm that the reputational motivation is sufficient.”)  
283 Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two 
Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 648–
49 (1999). 
284 Hunt, supra note 274, at 113. 
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that is already available to the market.285 Finally, and most 
damningly, though rating agencies purport to provide credit ratings, 
the bulk of their profits derive instead from selling regulatory 
entitlements.286 U.S. financial regulations are increasingly tied to 
credit ratings, leading market participants to push for higher ratings 
for credit products regardless of their underlying credit risk.287 In this 
story, companies, investors, and investment managers are all 
complicit in the rating agencies’ practice of assigning artificially 
high ratings; the market expects and encourages the rating agencies 
to perform their gatekeeping role poorly.288 In hindsight, all of these 
problems figured prominently in the disgraceful performance of the 
rating agencies leading up to the global financial crisis.289 
It is also worth noting that the credit rating agencies are 
relative novices when it comes to corporate loans (which represent 
the largest share of debt issued by private equity-owned companies), 
as opposed to public bonds, having only begun rating the former in 
1996.290 The demand for corporate loan ratings arose only recently, 
when the loan market began to look more like the bond market in 
                                                            
285 Partnoy, supra note 283, at 621. 
286 Id. at 623–24; Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are 
Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY 
PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 64 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 
2006). 
287Partnoy, supra note 286, at 75–76.  
288 See id. As an example, imagine that you are the investment manager for 
a large pension fund. For prudential reasons, SEC regulations require a 
minimum percentage of the fund’s assets to be invested in cash or AAA-
rated investments. Like any good investor, you know that low-risk assets 
(such as AAA-rated ones are intended to be) provide low returns. Since 
your compensation is based on achieving high returns for the pension fund 
and doing so demands greater risk, you will be happiest under a regime in 
which high-risk investments are falsely rated AAA. 
289 See generally Complaint, United States v. McGraw-Hill Companies, No. 
CV13-00779 (C.D.C.A. filed Feb. 4, 2013), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/849201325104924250796.PDF; Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Sues Standard & 
Poor’s for Fraud in Rating Mortgage-Backed Securities in the Years 
Leading up to the Financial Crisis (Feb. 5, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/February/13-ag-156.html [hereinafter 
DOJ Press Release] (alleging that Standard & Poor’s “issued inflated 
ratings that misrepresented the securities’ true risks”).  
290 Page & Swaffield, supra note 16, at 33.  
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terms of liquidity and creditor dispersion.291  
However, the spectacular pre-crisis failures of the rating 
agencies were not related to their ratings of corporate bonds or 
syndicated loans.292 Rather, the culprit was the ratings of the 
structured finance products tied to other assets—including bonds and 
loans.293 It is during this boom period that the practice of 
securitization exploded.294 In order to provide investors with cheap 
diversification and access to new asset classes, while keeping risky 
assets off their own books, financial institutions pooled cash-
producing assets (such as mortgages, credit card receivables, bonds, 
and syndicated loans) and sold investors rights to them.295 The rating 
agencies were called in to rate the securities issued by these 
securitization vehicles, and the market quickly witnessed the oddity 
of AAA ratings for securities tied to junk-rated assets.296 Coffee’s 
“market bubble story”297 seems a particularly fitting explanation: 
caught in the illusion of ever-increasing asset prices (in particular, 
housing prices), investors ceased doing their own due diligence, and 
the rating agencies succumbed to the allure of the seemingly endless 
stream of fees generated by the securitization machine.298   
While there is widespread agreement about the rating 
agencies’ failures in the mortgage securitization realm, the jury is 
still out on their performance in rating operating companies’ debt 
and the securitization vehicles (such as CLOs and CBOs) that invest 
in them.299 Even if credit rating agencies accurately rate the 
                                                            
291 Hill, supra note 282, at 53–54.  
292 DOJ Press Release, supra note 289.  
293 Id.  
294 Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the 
Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1266–67 (2009).  
295 Id. at 1265; Howell E. Jackson, Loan-Level Disclosure in Securitization 
Transactions: A Problem with Three Dimensions, in MOVING FORWARD: 
THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER CREDIT AND MORTGAGE FINANCE 189 
(Nicholas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., Brookings Institution Press 
2011). 
296 Eggert, supra note 294, at 1266–67.  
297 Coffee, supra note 99, at 323.  
298 Eggert, supra note 294, at 1298–1301. For the post-crisis regulatory 
fallout for the rating agencies, see Aline Darbellay & Frank Partnoy, Credit 
Rating Agencies Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 30 No. 12 BANKING & FIN. 
SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1, 3 (Dec. 2011). 
299 For the relevant differences between subprime mortgages and corporate 
loans, see Whitehead, supra note 15, at 646–50.  
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underlying company debt, if they are overly permissive in rating the 
securitization vehicles that invest in them, which now represent over 
60% of the leveraged loan market,300 it will result in over-lending to 
borrowers or in lending on overly permissive terms. 
With respect to the specific goal of minimizing borrower 
agency costs, it would seem that the credit rating agencies can 
perform, at best, only part of the task. Even assuming that they 
provide perfectly accurate ratings, this amounts only to an ex ante 
certification role, rather than an ex post monitoring role. The credit 
rating agencies’ key performance is completed upfront, in rating the 
debt at the time it is issued.301 While the rating agencies may 
downgrade a particular debt instrument after it has been issued, 
usually this will only be in response to information that is already 
public and therefore already reflected in its price, if it is traded.302 
More importantly, a downgrade is unlikely to effectively prevent 
corporate misbehavior ex ante to the same extent that private equity 
ownership would, all else being equal. It is true that issuers can be 
“punished” by a downgrade (say, if it further reduces the trading 
price of their debt), but two observations are in order.303 First, 
downgrades are rare, reserved for borrowers with widely known 
problems.304 Second, downgrades can only deter bad borrower 
behavior ex ante if the borrower has strong reputational stakes in the 
debt markets. And, as we have seen, this is less likely to be the case 
with most borrowers than it is with private equity-owned borrowers.   
Another way to see this is to consider that the rating agencies 
suffer no reputational harm themselves when they downgrade a 
borrower; the borrower’s misconduct after the loan has been issued 
does not reflect poorly on the rating agencies, but only on the 
borrower.305 In contrast, private equity firms are held responsible for 
misbehavior by their portfolio companies, and suffer reputational 
harm as a result.306 To conclude, even assuming that rating agencies 
are helpful in mitigating borrower adverse selection, by certifying 
                                                            
300 Bobrow et al., supra note 152, at 166.  
301 See Hill, supra note 282, at 48–50. 
302 Partnoy, supra note 283, at 661.  
303 See Hill, supra note 282, at 68 (“The very fact of a downgrade has an 
effect; even if no information about the present financial situation is being 
conveyed, investors will react.”).  
304 Id. at 65–67.  
305 See id. at 68–70.  
306 Masulis & Thomas, supra note 71, at 239.  
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borrowers’ quality ex ante, it is unclear whether rating agencies have 
any significant effect in mitigating borrower moral hazard.   
These existing (and widening) gaps in gatekeeping coverage 
in the debt markets create an opportunity for private equity firms to 
play a highly valuable role.307 The last piece of the puzzle is to 
determine how regulators should respond.   
 
C. Regulatory Implications 
 
Demonstrating that private equity adds value through 
gatekeeping does not answer the question of whether private equity 
increases social welfare overall: private equity has well-known costs 
associated with it, and the task of weighing these against its benefits 
is far from complete. Yet, it does disprove the common claim that 
regulators could costlessly stamp out or curtail private equity.   
Separately, the gatekeeper theory of private equity challenges 
the wisdom of the recent regulatory push to make private equity firms 
more accountable to their investors. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 
private equity firms are now, with very limited exceptions, required to 
register as investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940.308 This change represents a fundamental shift in the regulation 
and nature of private equity. The word “private” in private equity is no 
accident: private equity firms have always been notoriously loath to 
share detailed information about their investments and returns with 
even their own investors, and have jealously guarded their status as 
largely unregulated players.309   
                                                            
307 Frank Partnoy, among others, has proposed relying on credit default 
swap (“CDS”) spreads as an alternative to the credit rating agencies. Mark 
J. Flannery, Joel F. Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default Swap Spreads 
As Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2085 
(2010). Because the return on a CDS is determined by the probability of a 
given company defaulting on its debt, its price should reflect the market’s 
view of the company’s creditworthiness at any given time. Id. at 2088. Yet 
CDSs do not exist or are not heavily traded for most of the companies that 
private equity funds might acquire, particularly the smaller, private 
companies. 
308 Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 278, at §§ 401–416. The only private equity 
firms exempt from the registration requirement are certain foreign 
managers, small fund managers, and managers falling within the narrow 
category of “venture capital fund” advisers. Id. §§ 403, 407.  
309 See Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate Law, 
34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465, 468 (2009). 
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 As registered investment advisers, private equity firms will 
join the ranks of advisers such as mutual fund managers that are well 
accustomed to tight regulation and public scrutiny. In addition to 
putting private equity squarely on the securities regulators’ radar 
screen, this change is designed to make private equity firms more 
accountable to their own investors.310 It imposes additional public 
disclosure obligations and compliance requirements on private equity 
firms, and subjects them to anti-fraud provisions, above and beyond 
what investors in their funds may have contracted for.311 Most 
significantly, registered investment advisers have non-waivable 
fiduciary duties toward their investors312—duties which private 
equity firms have heretofore deliberately avoided.313 Notably, these 
changes did not come about at the behest of private equity investors.  
Ironically, the result of making private equity firms more 
accountable to their investors may well be lower returns for such 
investors (in addition to increased borrowing costs for portfolio 
companies), precisely because doing so hinders private equity firms’ 
ability to act as gatekeepers. To successfully perform their 
gatekeeping function, private equity firms must have the leeway to 
forego short-term profit opportunities at creditors’ expense for the 
sake of maximizing long-term profit by maintaining a good 
reputation with creditors.314 This privileging of long-term reputation 
                                                            
310 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Act 
Amendments to Investment Advisers Act (June 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-133.htm. 
311 See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2006). 
312 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963). 
313 In the past, limited partnership agreements for private equity funds often 
required investors (the limited partners) to waive the fiduciary duties of the 
private equity firm (the general partner). William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd 
Henderson, One Hat Too Many? Investment Desegregation in Private 
Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 51–53 (2009). In Delaware, the jurisdiction 
of choice for U.S. private equity limited partnerships, such as waiver is 
expressly permitted by statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) 
(providing that the general partner’s fiduciary duties “may be expanded or 
restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership agreement,” with 
the exception of the contract-based duty of good faith and fair dealing). For 
a history of this provision and its impact, see Birdthistle & Henderson, 
supra.  
314 In other words, a key reason why private equity investors grant wide 
latitude to private equity firms in their fund agreements is that this structure 
maximizes long-term returns to investors. Axelson, Strömberg & Weisbach, 
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maximizes returns for investors in private equity funds as a whole 
and over time.315 The difficulty is that individual investors in private 
equity funds do not have the same incentive as the private equity 
firm itself to preserve the firm’s long-term reputation, primarily 
because private equity funds have limited lifecycles.316   
Take a given investor in a given private equity fund of a 
given private equity firm, and assume that the fund will complete 
only six acquisitions during its ten-year life span. Once the fund has 
invested all of its pooled cash, the private equity firm will raise a 
successor fund, and so on ad infinitum. (In addition, the private 
equity firm manages several active funds at any given time, each 
with a different investment focus.) Assume that the fund in question 
is on the verge of making its final acquisition. At this point, unless it 
has committed to invest in the successor fund, our investor will want 
the private equity firm to defect from its long-term, optimal strategy 
of behaving well towards creditors. The investor will want the 
private equity firm to maximize short-term profits on the fund’s final 
deal by extracting as much wealth as possible from creditors, 
because it will bear none of the future harm from the private equity 
firms’ loss of reputation.317 Having benefited from the private equity 
firm’s reputational capital up until that point (through cheaper debt 
for the fund’s acquisitions), the investor will now want the firm to 
spend all of that capital on the final deal. Thus, if the private equity 
firm, as a registered investment adviser, has a fiduciary obligation to 
maximize profits for its investors in each fund and is required to 
disclose all pertinent return calculations to investors, it may well be 
forced into maximizing short-term profits at the expense of its long-
term reputation and long-term profits.318   
                                                                                                                              
supra note 173, at 1549 (justifying the particular structure of private equity 
funds as maximizing returns to limited partners (investors)). In essence, the 
fund agreement is a self-binding mechanism for investors, preventing 
individual opportunistic behavior that would harm the group. 
315 Id. 
316 Id. at 1574.  
317 The private equity investor’s incentives are thus very different from 
those of a public equity investor. Because public companies have infinite 
lives and investment periods and their shares are liquid, the public company 
shareholder should generally want to maximize the long-term value of the 
company because it will determine today’s share price. 
318 Of course, what fiduciary duties actually require in this example is 
unclear. For an overview of the problem of fiduciary duty indeterminacy in 
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Thus, making private equity firms more accountable to their 
investors may well impede private equity firms’ gatekeeping 
function, to the detriment of private equity investors as a whole.319 
This, in turn, will undercut the gatekeeping benefits of a lower cost 
of capital for portfolio companies and lower agency costs. In the 
absence of material benefits to investors from having private equity 





Private equity firms have evolved from “Barbarians at the 
Gate” into keepers of the gate. By using their reputations to bridge 
the information gap between companies and lenders, private equity 
firms afford companies access to unprecedented levels of debt 
financing, and on highly favorable terms. This novel conception of 
private equity firms as gatekeepers suggests that their value lies at 
least as much in their ability to broker cheap debt as in their much-
touted expertise with “turnarounds” and corporate governance. And 
private equity firms will continue to be handsomely rewarded for 
their gatekeeping services: with today’s increasingly complex and 
dispersed corporate lending structures, reputable private equity firms 
fill a gaping void left by a decline in lender monitoring and the 
                                                                                                                              
corporate law, see Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
319 The same is true of the very recent phenomenon of private equity firms 
themselves “going public.” In an irony of both nomenclature and mission, 
some of the very largest private equity firms in the world have recently 
issued shares to the general public. Manesh, supra note 309, at 466–70 
(describing prominent examples of private equity firms going public). 
Though much has been made of the repercussions for corporate governance 
(of both the private equity firm and its portfolio companies), the 
repercussions for private equity’s borrowing advantage have been entirely 
overlooked. By tethering private equity firms to short-term stock price 
movements, public shareholders may lose the long-term value of private 
equity firms’ ability to obtain favorable financing for portfolio companies. 
320 In contrast, the gatekeeper theory of private equity does not entail any a 
priori objections to other recent policy prescriptions affecting private 
equity, including (1) the proposed elimination of the favorable tax treatment 
for private equity professionals and (2) the Volcker Rule prohibition on 
banks investing in or sponsoring private equity funds. See supra notes 66, 
283–84 and accompanying text.  
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failure of traditional debt-market gatekeepers. Demonstrating that 
private equity creates value through gatekeeping dispels the 
persistent myth of private equity as a mere wealth transfer. That 
should change both our understanding of private equity and our 
approach to regulating it. 
 
Appendix A: Repeated-Game Model of Private Equity Borrowing 
 
The model below demonstrates that private equity firms’ 
reputational stakes in the debt markets incentivize them to mitigate 
agency costs in their portfolio companies, resulting in lower costs of 
debt capital for private equity-owned companies as a whole.  
Section 1 models the credit decision in an end-game between 
a borrowing company and its lenders. It demonstrates that lenders 
will demand higher interest rates to lend to companies with highly 
leveraged capital structures (including private equity portfolio 
companies), due to their increased agency costs.321 The initial setup 
of the debt agency cost problem in Section 1 is a modification of the 
basic credit-rationing model found in Tirole (2006).322 
Section 2 extends the framework to show that a private 
equity firm’s concern for its reputation in the debt markets—that is, 
for its future payoffs in repeated iterations of the lending game—can 
mitigate the debt agency problem. Specifically, it models the credit 
decision in an indefinitely repeated game between a private equity 
firm, negotiating debt financing for one of its portfolio companies, 
and lenders. The model demonstrates that under plausible conditions, 
private equity firms are incentivized to behave well toward lenders 
(that is, to limit moral hazard in the borrowing company) in every 
round of the game because lenders will reward such behavior with 
lower interest rates.     
 
Section 1. End Game Between Borrower and Lender 
 
Take a company with initial assets A, where A is the owner’s 
equity stake in the company or net worth. The company wishes to 
make an investment I. The company can invest in either a “good” 
project G or a “bad” project B. There are only two possible outcomes 
for each project, “success” or “failure.” The bad project B has a 
                                                            
321 Of the two debt agency costs, moral hazard and adverse selection, this 
model covers only the former for simplicity. 
322 See TIROLE, supra note 124, at 114. 
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higher return in the event of success (RB > RG), but a lower (zero) 
return in the event of failure (FG > FB=0). The probability of success 
for the bad and good projects are pB and pG, respectively, where pG > 
pB. While each project has a positive net value (i.e., I is less than the 
expected return on the project), project B is worse than project G 
from the point of view of a risk-neutral investor, in the sense that the 
expected return on B is less than the expected return on G. That is:  
 
ܫ ൏ ݌஻ܴܤ ൏ ሺ݌ீܴீ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ீሻܨீሻ  
 
In order to make the investment, the company borrows (I – 
A) at an interest rate r. For simplicity, we ignore time by assuming 
that investment and repayment happen almost simultaneously, such 
that r reflects only the risk premium. 
The company will prefer to invest in project G so long as the 
expected profit to the company from G exceeds the expected profit to 
the company from B:  
 
݌ீ൫ܴீ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯
൅	ሺ1 െ ݌ீሻܯܽݔሾܨீ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ, 0ሿ
൐ 	݌஻ሺܴ஻ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺܫ െ ܣሻሻ 
 
We assume ܨீ ൏ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ; that is, the good project is 
not a sure thing from the lenders’ perspective. Thus, the company 
chooses the good project so long as: 
 
݌ீ൫ܴீ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯ ൐ ݌஻ሺܴ஻ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺܫ െ ܣሻሻ 
 
 ܣ ൐ ܫ െ ௣ಸோಸି	௣ಳோಳ൫௣ಸି௣ಳ൯ሺଵା௥ሻ    (1) 
 
Thus, companies having assets/equity exceeding this 
threshold will invest in the good project G, while companies with 
insufficient equity will invest in the bad project B—they will 
succumb to moral hazard. Stated differently, the agency costs of debt 
increase with the company’s leverage. 
In this market, lenders will therefore lend at two different 
rates of interest: one for companies with enough equity (enough 
“skin in the game”)—that is, those satisfying equation (1)—and one 
for companies with low equity/high leverage. This is because the risk 
premium for lenders is different for the high-equity (low-leverage) 
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borrowers, who will invest in the good project G, and the low-equity 
(high-leverage) borrowers, who will invest in the bad project B. If 
the lenders are perfectly competitive and risk-neutral (for simplicity), 
and r is a competitive rate of interest at which the lenders break 
even, then the interest rate for high-equity/low-leverage borrowers rG 
will be such that the expected payout to the lenders from project G is 
exactly equal to the amount loaned to finance G. Thus, rG is defined 
by:323 
 
݌ீሺ1 ൅ ݎீሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ீሻܨீ ൌ ܫ െ ܣ 
 
ݎீ ൌ ൫ଵି௣ಸ൯௣ಸ ൈ ቀ1 െ
ிಸ
ሺூି஺ሻቁ   (2) 
 
The breakeven rate rB for low-equity/high-leverage borrowers is 
likewise defined by: 
 
݌஻ሺ1 ൅ ݎ஻ሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ ൌ ܫ െ ܣ  
 
ݎ஻ ൌ ൫ଵି௣ಳ൯௣      (3) 
 
It follows from equations (2) and (3) that rB > rG. Thus, the 
interest rate charged by lenders will be higher for companies 
investing with fewer assets/lower equity. 
The implications of this general model for private equity are 
straightforward. Private equity-owned companies tend to be highly 
leveraged, so in an end game with lenders, such a company would 
succumb to moral hazard and invest in worse projects. Knowing this 
ex ante, lenders will charge it a higher interest rate.  
 
Section 2. Repeated Game Between Borrower and 
Lender 
 
In this Section, the lenders are repeatedly lending to a 
portfolio company of a given private equity firm. The company has a 
small equity stake A, so according to the result derived in Section 1 it 
should be facing the higher rate of interest rB. But the private equity 
                                                            
323 Per the assumption made above that ܨீ ൏ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ. If the project 
fails, the company can only repay the return on the project in the event of 
failure, FG, and not the full amount actually owed, ሺ1 ൅ ݎீሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ. 
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firm implicitly commits to invest in the good project through its 
reputation and thus obtains the lower interest rate rG in the first round 
of the game. The lenders can always observe after the fact whether 
the private equity firm has chosen the good or the bad project, given 
that the outcomes are different under the two, but it cannot control 
the firm’s choice.324 The lenders will lend to the portfolio company 
at interest rate rG because of the private equity firm’s good 
reputation; but if it breaks its reputation in any period by investing in 
the bad project, it will face interest rate rB in all periods thereafter. 
The private equity firm’s decision tree is the following: 
 
 
We can now demonstrate that for plausible discount rates, 
the private equity firm has an incentive to invest always in the good 
project. It is sufficient to check whether the private equity firm gets a 
greater return from: 
(1) maintaining its reputation forever, thus earning the 
“cooperative” payoff ݌ீ൫ܴீ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎீሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯ each 
period; or 
(2) breaking its reputation today (“cheating”), thus earning a 
higher payoff ݌஻൫ܴ஻ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎீሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯ for one 
period, but a lower payoff ݌஻൫ܴ஻ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ஻ሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯ in 
all periods thereafter.  
The higher payoff from cheating is due to the greater attractiveness 
of the bad project and the low interest rate rG with which the private 
equity firm starts off. 
                                                            
324 A more complex model would allow for the possibility of unobservable 
actions. In that case lenders could not observe directly whether the private 
equity firm had chosen a good or bad investment opportunity, but when the 
portfolio company has a bad outcome and cannot repay its loan, the lender 
looks at the history of past performance and infers the likelihood that the 
private equity firm chose a bad project. In short, the private equity firm’s 
loan terms would in that case depend on the past history of successes and 
failures. And again, under plausible conditions, this would motivate private 
equity firms to invest in good projects. 
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The payoffs in future periods must be discounted for time 
and the likelihood of a continuing lending relationship. Define 
ߜ ൌ ௣ሺଵାఓሻ, where μ is the time-value of money, p is the probability in 
any given period that the game will be played again in the next 
period, and both μ and p are between 0 and 1. 
As depicted in the decision tree above, the private equity 
firm has two options: 
 
Option 1: The private equity firm always invests in the good 
project G in every period, such that its total expected profit will be: 
 
݌ீ൫ܴீ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎீሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯ ൅ ݌ீ൫ܴீ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎீሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯ߜ
൅ ݌ீ൫ܴீ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎீሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯ߜଶ ൅ ⋯ 
 




ሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൫ܴ
ீ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎீሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯ 
 
Option 2: The private equity firm invests in the bad project 
today (and is therefore punished with the higher interest rate in all 
subsequent periods), such that its expected profit is: 
 
݌஻൫ܴ஻ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎீሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯ ൅ ݌஻൫ܴ஻ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ஻ሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯ߜ
൅ ݌஻൫ܴ஻ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ஻ሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯ߜଶ ൅ ⋯ 
 
ൌ ݌஻൫ܴ஻ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎீሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯
൅ ߜሺ1 െ ߜሻ ݌
஻൫ܴ஻ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ஻ሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯ 
 
Option 2 illustrates that there is a short-term gain from 
cheating, but a long-term pain: the firm earns less in the periods after 
it breaks its reputation.325  
                                                            
325 This can be shown by demonstrating that ݌ீ൫ܴீ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎீሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯, 
the payoff in a period of good reputation, is greater than ݌஻൫ܴ஻ െ
1൅ݎܤܫെܣ, the payoff in a period of bad reputation. With some calculation, 
and substituting in the equilibrium values of the interest rates from 
equations (2) and (3), the proposition is true by definition of the good and 
bad projects. 
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The private equity firm will maintain its good reputation in 
all periods if its profit from always investing in G (Option 1) exceeds 
its profit from cheating by investing in B in the first period (Option 
2), that is if: 
 
݌ீ
ሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൫ܴ
ீ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎீሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯
൒ ݌஻൫ܴ஻ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎீሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯
൅ ߜሺ1 െ ߜሻ ݌
஻൫ܴ஻ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ஻ሻሺܫ െ ܣሻ൯ 
 
which, after some calculation and substituting in the equilibrium 
values of the interest rates from equations (2) and (3), is equivalent 
to: 
ߜ ൒ 1 െ ݌
ீܴீ െ ሺ1 െ ݌ீሻܨீ െ ݌஻ܴ஻





The numerator of the fraction in the final inequality is 
positive because the returns to the good project G are better by 
assumption. And the denominator is positive because 0 ൏ ݌஻ ൏
݌ீ ൏ 1. Thus, there are always values of ߜ close to 1 for which 
private equity firms will choose to cooperate with lenders. By 
definition of ߜ, a value of ߜ that is close to 1 requires: (a) a high 
probability p that the game will be repeated in subsequent periods—a 
reasonable assumption for private equity firms—and (b) a low time 
value of money r, such that patience will actually be rewarded.326  
Thus, the fact that private equity firms are in a repeated 
game with lenders entails that they will cooperate with lenders by 
mitigating agency costs. In turn, their portfolio companies will be 
rewarded with better loan terms than comparably leveraged 
companies can achieve. 
 
                                                            
326 Conversely, if the time value of money is too high, or the probability that 
the game will be repeated is too low, the benefit from cheating in the first 
period will outweigh the long-term pain from being punished by creditors in 
future periods, and the private equity firm will invest in bad projects. 
